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Summary
This thesis consists of three chapters on optimal mechanism design.1 The
first two chapters investigate contest design problems with incomplete infor-
mation. The third chapter studies the cost-minimizing two-stage procurement
contract when both moral hazard and adverse selection are present.
In the first chapter, we investigate contest mechanisms with independent
contestant private abilities. The contest designer has a fixed prize budget to
extract effort from the contestants using both positive and negative prizes. We
find that no mechanism can maximize the total effort. With exploding negative
prizes, the designer can extract effort approaching the highest possible effort
inducible when all contestants are of the maximum ability with certainty. With
a bound K on the negative prizes, however, an optimal contest mechanism
exists, implementable by a modified all-pay auction with an entry fee K and
a minimum bid.
The second chapter is closely related to the first one. In this chapter, we
characterize the optimal prize allocation in all-pay contests where the N(≥
2) contestants’ abilities are their private information. A contest organizer
1The first chapter is coauthored with Prof. Jingfeng Lu, Prof. Ruqu Wang, and Prof.
Jun Zhang; the second chapter and the third chapter are coauthored with Prof. Jingfeng
Lu.
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who has a fixed budget V (> 0) for prizes designs an effort-maximizing prize
allocation rule. Prizes can be positive or negative. While there is no entry
cost, contestants’ endogenous entry is explicitly accommodated and the prize
allocation rule can be contingent on the number of entrants. We find that the
optimal contest rule essentially involves endogenous entry. Specifically, only
contestants with higher abilities enter. At the optimum, every entrant pays
an optimally set entry fee K(> 0) and makes his bid. If everyone enters, the
highest bidder wins V + NK; If there are only n(< N) entrants, a winner is
randomly drawn among the entrants to be the winner of the prize V + nK.
This result is robust when the contestant incurs an entry cost to participate.
When the contestants are protected by limited liability, i.e., no negative prize
is allowed, the optimal contest reduces to a standard winner-take-all all-pay
auction, which induces full entry.
Procurement often involves a dynamic flow of information and unobserv-
able R&D investment. In the third chapter, we study the optimal procurement
mechanism in a two-stage environment with R&D. The principal wishes to pro-
cure a product from an agent. At the first stage, the agent can conduct R&D
to discover more cost efficient way of production. The agent’s efficiency in
conducting R&D can be high or low, which is his private information, and his
effort level in R&D is unobservable to the principal. Higher R&D effort leads
viii
to a better distribution of production cost in the sense of first-order stochastic
dominance. At the second stage, the agent’s cost of supplying the product is
randomly drawn according to the distribution determined by his R&D effort.
The cost, whose distribution is fully endogenous, is again privately observed by
the agent. The principal’s goal is to minimize the expected procurement cost
through a two-stage mechanism. The unobservability of effort is crucial for
the discriminatory allocation. The optimal deterministic two-stage mechanism
can be implemented by a menu of two single-stage fixed-price contracts with
different remedies for the principal when the agent defaults. Higher delivery
price is associated with higher default remedy. The efficient type chooses the
contract with higher price but higher remedy, while the inefficient type opts
for the contract with lower price but lower remedy.
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Chapter 1
Optimal Contest Design with
Incomplete Information
1.1 Introduction
Many activities and events, such as promotions within organizations, school
admissions, political elections, R&D races and sports, can be viewed as con-
tests. Contests, as a well established institution, essentially incentivize contes-
tants to exert costly and irreversible effort by awarding prizes to the winners.
A contestant may possess private information, such as his own ability, talent,
strength, or valuation for the prize. A contest designer desires an optimal
prize architecture to deal with such private information to achieve her objec-
tive. This objective is total effort maximization in our paper, as is usually the
case in the contest literature such as Moldovanu and Sela [36].
This optimal contest design problem is very similar to the optimal auction
design problem. The abilities of the contestants in a contest can be math-
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ematically translated into the valuations of the bidders in an auction. The
prizes in the contest can be reinterpreted as the winning probabilities in the
auction. Meanwhile, effort from the contestants in the contest can be treated
as payments from the bidders in the auction. Therefore, maximizing the total
effort from the contestants by optimally allocating the prizes is equivalent to
maximizing the total payments from the bidders by optimally allocating the
winning probabilities. As such, we make use of the well developed techniques
on optimal auction design pioneered by Myerson [41] to analyze the optimal
contest design problem.
The above two problems, however, are not the same. In particular, we
allow for negative prizes in our contest design problem. This relaxation in
the prize structure differentiates our paper from existing studies in the auc-
tion design literature, as well as in the contest design literature. Negative
prizes are technically equivalent to negative winning probabilities in auctions.
Without allowing for negative prizes, the optimal contest design problem is
mathematically equivalent to the optimal auction design problem in Myerson
[41]. Once negative prizes are allowed, Myerson’s [41] technique is no longer
adequate. In this paper, we characterize the optimal contest mechanism using
the techniques of continuous linear programming.
In an optimal auction, the bidder with the highest virtual valuation (if it
2
is higher than the seller’s reservation value) should have a winning probability
equal to one and all other bidders should have zero probability of winning.
Allowing for negative prizes in contests is equivalent to allowing for negative
winning probabilities in auctions. It creates an additional avenue to increase
the seller’s revenue in auctions (or, equivalently, the contestants’ effort in con-
tests). Allocating a negative prize to a contestant with a lower (including
negative) virtual ability would increase the positive prize to a contestant with
a higher virtual ability by the same amount while keeping the total prize bud-
get unchanged.1 This kind of leveraging on the contestants’ virtual abilities
relaxes the original optimization constraints and increases the total level of
effort elicited. Of course, we still need to ensure that the interim individual
rationality constraints for the lower ability contestants are satisfied by award-
ing them with positive prizes at appropriate occasions. The optimal contest
mechanism finds the optimal balance between these incentives.
We obtain two surprising results. First, we find that an optimal contest
mechanism does not exist. Second, any level of total effort arbitrarily close to
the utmost total effort (i.e., the highest total effort that can be induced when
all contestants are of the maximum ability with certainty) can be achieved by
an incentive compatible contest mechanism. This level of total effort is much
1“Virtual ability” in this paper is parallel to “virtual value” in Myerson [41].
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more than the level from the full surplus extraction using the optimal auctions
techniques, as all contestants having the maximum ability is an unlikely event.
It is worth noting that this result is derived under the assumption that types
are independently distributed.2
Negative prizes play a crucial role in the above results. Certain features in
real-life contests could lead to negative prizes for the contestants. In the FCC-
organized contest to set the standard for high-definition television, any firm
can enter the contest but with a 200, 000 entry fee (cf. Taylor [55]). A firm
that enters but not winning the contest thus gets a negative prize. Similarly,
professional tournaments, such as golf, sailing, chess and horse racing, often
charge significant membership fees, registration fees, nomination fees and/or
starting fees, which constitute a significant portion of the prizes. In certain
poker tournaments, as another example, in order to compete, a player needs
to pay a “buy-in,” which is an upfront payment that goes towards the winning
prize pool. In this case, this “buy-in” becomes the negative prize if a player
loses in the game.
There must be a limit on the amount of negative prizes that one can set.
Unfortunately, in order to induce effort levels closer and closer to the utmost
2(Almost) full surplus extraction in auctions requires the bidders’ types to be correlated.
In our model, the abilities of the contestants are distributed independently, making it even
more difficult to extract full surplus. See the discussions after Proposition 1 for more details.
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total effort, the contest designer needs to impose larger and larger negative
prizes on the contestants. This is obviously not always feasible. In this paper,
we address this issue by analyzing a bounded negative prize problem. We
assume that any negative prize cannot exceed a bound K, which is common
to all contestants. We characterize the optimal contest mechanism given K.
This mechanism features a threshold level of ability that depends on K. When
K is small, contestants cannot be punished too severely, and the threshold level
is exactly the same as the cut-off level in the optimal auction mechanism in
Myerson [41]. When K is large, however, the threshold is strictly higher than
the cut-off in Myerson [41]. This threshold is important. When the abilities
of all contestants are lower than the threshold, all contestants share equally
either a portion (in the former case) or the entirety (in the latter case) of the
original prize budget. Equivalently, a contestant is randomly selected as the
winner of the relevant prize. When the highest ability of the contestants is
above the threshold, this highest ability contestant will receive an enhanced
prize, which is equal to the original prize budget plus the extra money collected
from the negative prizes imposed on other contestants.
This optimal contest mechanism can be implemented by a modified all-pay
auction with the following features: an entry fee equal to K (i.e., the bound
on the negative prize), a minimum bid, and a grand prize equal to the original
5
prize budget plus all of the entry fees. In a traditional auction, a bidder gets
zero if he does not bid. In our modified all-pay auction, contestants share a
prize or they are randomly selected as a single winner of the prize when no one
bids. This feature of the mechanism serves two purposes. First, as required
by the efficiency consideration, contestants with low abilities are never asked
to exert effort as it is less efficient. Second, it is to ensure the participation
from the low ability contestants since they pay an entry fee.3
Our paper belongs to the literature on optimal contest design with incom-
plete information. Fullerton and McAfee [19] study the optimal shortlisting in
a procurement environment. They allow the sponsor to use entry fees to screen
the firms and offset costs of the procurement. Optimal prize allocation has
been studied in various all-pay auction frameworks starting from the seminal
work of Moldovanu and Sela [36]. They establish the winner-take-all principle
in contest under linearity assumptions. Minor [35] reexamines this principle
in cases where contestants have convex costs of effort and where the contest
designer has concave benefit of effort. Moldovanu and Sela [37] generalize
their own investigation to a two-stage all-pay auction framework. Meanwhile,
Moldovanu et al. [38] analyze the environment where contestants care about
3We may not observe this exactly in reality. However, most real life contests have sub-
sequent ones, usually to be held, say a year later. Therefore, accumulating the unawarded
prize money for the prize pool of next year’s contest (as the US Lotto) would have similar
effects as distributing the money right away.
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their relative status. They further allow for negative prizes in Moldovanu et
al. [39].
There are two major differences between our paper and the above works
on optimal prize allocation. The first difference is that our analysis accommo-
dates any contest rule that allocates the budget contingent on the contestants’
reported type profile, while theirs focus on all-pay auctions. The second dif-
ference is that we model negative prize differently. In Moldovanu et al. [39], a
negative prize, which they call punishment, is costly for the organizer to im-
plement. In our paper, when negative prizes are imposed on some contestants,
similarly to Fullerton and McAfee [19], the money collected can be utilized by
the contest designer to strengthen the incentives to other contestants.
The mechanism design approach utilized in our analysis has also been em-
ployed by Polishchuk and Tonis [47] to examine the optimal contest design, but
they focus on nonnegative prizes. Kirkegaard [25] uses a similar approach to
study the optimal favoritism in contests with asymmetric players. Our paper
differentiates from these existing studies in providing a first investigation on
the role of negative prizes using a mechanism design approach. Our analysis
sheds light on the necessity of negative prizes in the optimal mechanism and
the leverage of prizes on contestants with different virtual abilities.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present
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the model. In Section 3, we carry out our analysis on the optimal contest
design. We show that there exists no optimal mechanism, and then construct
a sequence of mechanisms which can achieve almost the utmost total effort.
These mechanisms require large negative prizes to be imposed with positive
probability. Section 4 considers the case where negative prizes are bounded. In
a sequence of analytical steps, we fully characterize the optimal contest under
the regularity condition of increasing virtual ability function. In Section 5, we
provide some concluding remarks. An appendix collects long proofs.
1.2 The model
A risk neutral contest designer has a total prize budget of V > 0 to elicit
effort from N ≥ 2 risk neutral contestants in a contest. This budget V does
not need to be all in cash; it could be the value to the contestants of non-
monetary and sometimes indivisible rewards, such as honors, recognitions and
gifts. Each contestant has an ability for the contest. The cost for contestant
i with ability ti to exert effort ei ≥ 0 is given by c(ei, ti) = ei/ti. This
ability or type ti,
4 is the private information of contestant i, and it follows an
independent and identical distribution with cumulative distribution function
F (·), and probability density function f(·) which is strictly positive on support
4In Moldovanu and Sela [36], a contestant’s ability is defined as ci =
1
ti
, which is mathe-
matically equivalent.
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[a, b] with a > 0. The parameter b is referred as the maximum ability. Similarly
to Myerson [41], we define J(ti) = ti − 1−F (ti)f(ti) as the virtual ability function.
The payoff of a contestant in the contest is equal to the prize he receives
minus his cost of effort. The contest designer uses the prize budget V to induce
effort from the contestants. At the same time, if there is money left in the
budget, she values that money as well. To simplify the notation, assume that
there is a linear relationship between effort and money for the contest designer.
Let t0 denote the money to effort ratio; 1 dollar is equivalent to t0 units of
effort. If the contest designer’s objective is to maximize the total effort, then
t0 = 0. Assume that t0 is common knowledge.
5 Note that the cost of 1 unit
of effort for the maximum ability (b) contestant is 1/b, which needs to be less
than 1/t0, the value of 1 unit of effort to the contest designer; otherwise, it
is obviously optimal for the designer not to spend any of the prize budget.
Therefore, we assume that t0 < b.
According to the revelation principle, we can focus our analysis on direct
mechanisms. Let t˜i ∈ [a, b] be the report of contestant i regarding his own
ability. Then we can define contestant i’s prize and effort as functions of the
profile of reports t˜ = (t˜1, · · · , t˜N) by vi(˜t) and ei(˜t), respectively.6 Given the
5As we shall see later, this t0 is similar to the reservation value of a seller in the auction
design problem.
6This is similar to auction analysis. Given the profile of type reports from the bidders,
the auctioneer determines the probability of winning and and the payment of each bidder.
9
profile of reports t˜ = (t˜1, · · · , t˜N), the contest designer gives a prize of vi(˜t) to
contestant i and demands an effort of ei(˜t) from him.
7 A direct contest mech-
anism can thus be denoted by (v(˜t), e(˜t)), where v(˜t) = (v1(˜t), · · · , vN (˜t))
and e(˜t) = (e1(˜t), · · · , eN (˜t)).
In the following section, we will examine the existence of the optimal mech-
anism and offer remedies when it does not exist.
1.3 Optimal contest design and utmost total
effort
The model setup in the previous section hints at the connections between an
optimal auction problem and an optimal contest problem. In this section, in
the process of analyzing the optimal contest design, we will illustrate how the
two distinguish themselves from each other.
1.3.1 Positive and Negative Prizes





where t−i = (t1, ...ti−1, ti+1, ...tN) and f−i(t−i) denotes the density of t−i.
7vi(˜t) and ei(˜t) can be interpreted as expected prize and effort in a stochastic mechanism.
As everyone’s payoff is linear in effort and prizes, the divisibility of the prizes is not an
issue; the probabilities of winning can be used to get around the divisibility problem and
accommodate the stochastic mechanisms.
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Given that other contestants truthfully report their abilities, contestant i’s















The contest designer maximizes the expected total effort from the contes-
tants plus the effort equivalent of any money left in the prize budget. In the
rest of the analysis, this designer is to maximize this total effort equivalent (or














subject to the following feasibility constraints:
ui(ti, ti) ≥ ui(t˜i, ti),∀t˜i, ti,∀i, (1.4)
ui(ti, ti) ≥ 0,∀ti,∀i, (1.5)∑
i
vi(t) ≤ V, ∀t, (1.6)
ei(t) ≥ 0,∀t, ∀i. (1.7)
The feasibility constraints consist of four parts: (1.4) is the incentive compat-
ibility constraint, (1.5) is the participation constraint, (1.6) is the designer’s
budget constraint, and (1.7) is the nonnegative effort constraint.
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We are now ready to compare our optimal contest design problem with the
optimal auction design problem in Myerson [41]. There are three similarities.
First, the prize allocations here correspond to the object winning probabilities
there. The sum of the winning probabilities in an auction must not exceed 1,
while the sum of the prizes awarded in a contest must not exceed V . (Note
that the total prize budget V can be normalized to 1.) Second, the effort here
resembles the transfer payments there. Third, the contest designer’s objective
function here is equivalent to the auction designer’s revenue there (with t0
being the seller’s reservation value).
Despite these similarities, there are two main differences, both lie in the
restrictions on the choice variables. First, in an optimal auction design prob-
lem, the winning probabilities must be nonnegative. In our optimal contest
design problem, the prizes for the contestants can be positive or negative, and
this enlarges the set of feasible mechanisms. Negative prizes provide a venue
for further enhancing the contest design by leveraging the differences in the
contestants’ virtual abilities. For a given ability profile t, the negative prizes
to lower ability contestants can be used to increase the positive prizes to higher
ability contestants while still balancing the prize budget. This would improve
the total effort exerted by the contestants even if the participation constraints
for the lower types still need to be satisfied. Second, the monetary transfers in
12
the optimal auction design problem can be positive or negative. However, in
our optimal contest design problem, effort must be non-negative. This shrinks
the set of feasible mechanisms and thus strictly reduces the amount of effort
that can be induced.8
Putting these two conflicting effects together, it is not clear whether the
optimal contest can do better than the optimal auction. Allowing for negative
prizes is seemingly a small deviation from the conventional auction design
literature. But it creates significant technical challenges in the analysis. By
resolving these challenges, we obtain significantly different results and insights.
In the analysis for the optimal contest design, there is no obvious way to
optimally leverage on the prizes assigned to different abilities of the contes-
tants. In the rest of this section, we devote our analysis to solving this optimal
contest design problem through the leveraging exercise.
Define u˜i(t˜i, ti) = ti · ui(t˜i, ti). Then




Constraints (1.4) and (1.5) can be rewritten in terms of u˜i(·, ·). From (1.4)
8One can show that allowing negative prizes and negative effort in contest setting (or,
equivalently, allowing negative winning probabilities and negative monetary transfers in
auction setting) would lead to feasible mechanisms generating arbitrarily high expected
total effort (or, equivalently, arbitrarily high expected revenue).
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Standard derivations such as those in Myerson [41] lead to the following lemma.
The proof is omitted here.
Lemma 1.1. Mechanism (v(·), e(·)) is feasible if and only if the following
conditions hold together with (1.6) and (1.7):
∫
t−i
ei(ti, t−i)f−i(t−i)dt−i = tiVi(ti)−
∫ ti
a
Vi(s)ds− a · ui(a, a),∀ti,∀i,(1.9)
Vi(t
′
i) ≥ Vi(ti), ∀t′i > ti,∀i, (1.10)
ui(a, a) ≥ 0,∀i. (1.11)
Condition (1.9) is a direct implication of the incentive compatibility con-
straint. It implies that the contestants’ expected effort levels e(·) can be fully
pinned down by the prize structure v(·). In other words, two mechanisms
with the same prize functions would generate the same total expected effort.
Apparently, this result is parallel to the Revenue Equivalence Theorem in the
auction design literature. Condition (1.10) requires that the expected prize
must be increasing in a contestant’s ability, and it is parallel to the increasing
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expected winning probability condition in the auction design. Condition (1.11)
implies that a contestant with the lowest ability must be willing to participate,
same as in the auction design. We are now ready to investigate the existence
of an optimal contest mechanism.
1.3.2 Problem (P)
Note that in the optimal contest, ui(a, a) = 0, i.e., the lowest ability contestant
must earn zero informational rent. Otherwise, the contest designer can simply
decrease the informational rent for every ability and yield a higher level of
expected total effort. Given (1.1) and (1.9), we can replace effort e(·) by the






[J(ti)− t0] vi(t)f(t)dt + t0V. (1.12)
Therefore, the contest designer’s optimization problem can be restated as
maximizing (1.12), subject to (1.6), (1.7), (1.9) and (1.10). We denote this
maximization problem as problem (P) and the resulting mechanism as the
optimal mechanism.
A useful benchmark effort level is the utmost total effort, which is the
highest amount of total effort inducible given budget V . This level of effort is
achieved when all contestants are of the maximum ability b for sure, and it is
equal to bV . We can see this from the following arguments. First, the total
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effort induced cannot be higher than bV from the participation constraints of
the contestants. Second, the effort level bV can be obtained by asking each of
the N contestants to exert effort e = bV/N and awarding each of them a prize
of V/N . In the rest of the analysis, we will mostly compare the total effort
generated from a mechanism with this (upper bound) utmost total effort.
We will approach problem (P) using the following method. We first relax
the monotonicity condition in expected prize (condition (1.10)) and establish
an upper bound for the expected total effort level in this relaxed problem (de-
noted as P-Relax). Second, we show that there exists no optimal mechanism
in this relaxed problem. Third, we construct a mechanism that is feasible for
both the relaxed problem (P-Relax) and the original problem (P), and show
that the expected total effort level in this mechanism can approach arbitrarily
close to the upper bound (i.e., the utmost total effort). Since the upper bound
can only be approached (but not reached) in both problems, these results
imply that there exists no optimal mechanism in the original problem (P).
1.3.3 Problem (P-Relax)















vi(ti, t−i)f−i(t−i)dt−i ≥ 0, ∀ti,∀i. (1.15)
This is a relaxed problem of (P): the objective function is the same but the
feasibility constraints are less restrictive than the original ones. To see this,
first note that constraint (1.14) is the same as (1.6). Second, constraint (1.15)
is implied by the feasibility constraints in (P). This is because from the mono-
tonicity condition (1.10), it suffices to show that Vi(a) ≥ 0,∀i. From (1.9),
evaluating at vi = a, we obtain aVi(a) =
∫
t−i
ei(a, t−i)f−i(t−i)dt−i, which is
non-negative from the non-negative effort constraint (1.7).
The relaxed problem (P-Relax) is a continuous linear programming prob-
lem. We construct the Lagrangian by applying multiplier λ(t) to constraint
(1.14) and µi(ti) to constraint (1.15) before integrating them and adding them




























Suppose that an optimal solution exists. Then it must satisfy the following
Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
[J(ti)− t0]− λ(t) + µi(ti) = 0,∀t,∀i, (1.17)
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λ(t) ≥ 0, V −
∑
i















vi(ti, t−i)f−i(t−i)dt−i = 0,∀ti,∀i. (1.19)
We show that there is no vi(t) which can satisfy all of these conditions.
We have the following lemma.
Lemma 1.2. An optimal solution does not exist for problem (P-Relax).
Although the above lemma shows that an optimal contest mechanism does
not exist for the relaxed problem (P-Relax), we can nevertheless establish that
the utmost total effort bV is an upper bound for the total effort in all feasible
mechanisms in problem (P-Relax). In problem (P-Relax), the abilities of the
contestants are usually less than b, and the total effort elicited in any feasible
mechanism must be less than bV . We have the following lemma.
Lemma 1.3. The expected total effort elicited in problem (P-Relax) is strictly
less than bV .
The above lemma is very intuitive. The total effort level of bV should
be achievable only when all (or at least one) contestants have the maximum
ability b with certainty. In our setting, every contestant’s ability is strictly
lower than b almost surely. It is thus well expected that the expected effort
level of bV is an unreachable upper bound for problem (P-Relax).
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In the following analysis, we will show, however, that for problem (P-
Relax), there exists a sequence of mechanisms inducing total effort levels ap-
proaching bV arbitrarily closely, even though an optimal mechanism does not
exist. Therefore, this sequence of mechanisms is asymptotically optimal.
The sequence of mechanisms that we will construct is closely related to K,
a parameter which we later on define as the maximum negative prize that the
contest designer can impose on a contestant. It can also be interpreted as the
entry fee in a contest.




N−1 ), t∗(K) = max{J−1(t0), tˆ(K)}
and Λ(K) = K
FN−1(t∗(K)) −K. Note that Λ(K) ∈ (0, VN ]. Let S∗(K) = {j : tj >
t∗(K)}, i.e., the set of contestants with abilities higher than the cutoff, and
let t(1) denote the first order statistics of t. We define the following sequence
of mechanisms (v∗(·;K), e∗(·;K)) associated with K.
Definition 1.1 (K-mechanism). The prize allocation function is given by
v∗i (t;K) =

Λ(K), if S∗(K) = ∅,
−K, if S∗(K) 6= ∅ and ti < t(1),
V + (N − 1)K, if S∗(K) 6= ∅ and ti = t(1).
(1.20)
The effort function is given by
e∗i (t;K) = ε(ti;K) ≡
{







i (s;K)ds, if ti > t
∗(K),
(1.21)
where V ∗i (ti;K) =
∫
t−i
v∗i (t;K)f−i(t−i)dt−i is the expected prize function.
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Note that the above effort function e∗i (t;K) depends on contestant i’s type
ti only, and it is symmetric among all contestants. (So we denote it as ε(ti;K).)
Furthermore, it is strictly increasing in ti for ti > t
∗(K). We have the following
lemma.
Lemma 1.4. Each K-mechanism (v∗(·;K), e∗(·;K)) is feasible in both prob-





[J(ti)− t0] [(V +NK)FN−1(ti)−K]dF (ti) + t0V.
When K goes to +∞, the expected total effort elicited by the mechanism goes
to bV and the expected payoffs of the contestants go to zero. In the limit, the
contestant with the maximum ability b enjoys a positive but finite informational
rent V
Nbf(b)
; all other types enjoy zero information rent.
This lemma shows that even when the abilities of the contestants are dis-
tributed randomly (and therefore their abilities are most likely to be less than
the maximum b), the contest designer can still elicit almost bV , the total effort
elicitable when all contestants are of ability b, through the above mechanisms.
In each of these mechanisms, there is a cut-off ability. If none of the contes-
tants has an ability higher than this cut-off, then every contestant gets a prize
Λ(K), which is no bigger than V/N ; equivalently, each player wins a prize
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of NΛ(K) with probability 1/N . But if at least one of the contestants has
an ability higher than the cut-off, then every contestant (except the highest
ability contestant) will be punished by a negative prize −K. This highest abil-
ity contestant gets the prize budget V plus the extra money generated from
the negative prizes from other contestants. The interim incentive to partici-
pate for the lower ability contestants is maintained by the positive prize Λ(K)
when no contestant has an ability above the cut-off. In the equilibrium of
this mechanism, those contestants with abilities below the cut-off exert zero
effort. Meanwhile, contestants with abilities higher than the cut-off exert a
large amount of effort. The level of total expected effort converges to the
utmost total effort.
These mechanisms are contest mechanisms as they rely on the relative
ranking of efforts of the contestants. Not all contest mechanisms allowed in
our analysis resemble real-life contests, similarly to the analysis of auction
mechanisms considered in Myerson [41]. As we shall see in Proposition 3, our
optimal contest mechanism can be implemented by an all-pay auction, which
is an extreme form of contest.
At this point, it is not obvious how we came up with the above mechanisms.
In the next section, we shall show that (v∗(·;K), e∗(·;K)) is in fact an optimal
contest mechanism if K is the maximum negative prize we can impose on a
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contestant.
The nonnegativity of Vi(·) turns out to be a binding constraint for the upper
bound effort level in Lemma 1.3. The discussion following Proposition 1.1 will
reveal that allowing Vi(·) to be negative (implying that effort is sometimes
negative) could lead to a total effort level infinitely larger than bV .
Lemma 1.4 implies that for the original contest design problem (P), the
contest designer can obtain an expected total effort level arbitrarily close to
the utmost total effort bV . It also implies that there is no optimal solution for
problem (P). This can be seen from the following reasoning. Since problem
(P-Relax) is a relaxed problem of problem (P), the upper bound effort level bV
in Lemma 1.3 must apply to problem (P) as well. From Lemma 1.4, this upper
bound is a supremum for both problems. This supremum is not reachable in
problem (P-Relax), and therefore it is not reachable in problem (P). Hence,
problem (P) has no solution. These results are summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1.1. There exists no optimal contest mechanism in problem (P).
Nevertheless, the contest designer can obtain an expected total effort level that
is arbitrarily close to the utmost total effort bV ; meanwhile, the expected sur-
plus of a contestant is arbitrarily close to zero.
The intuitions behind these results can be illustrated as follows. The higher
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ability contestants are willing to expend more effort for a given prize than the
lower ones because of lower cost of effort. Therefore, there is some scope for
moving the effort from the lower ability contestants to the higher ones, as this
will save money for the contest designer.
To accomplish this maneuver, first suppose that effort can be negative.
Then a lower ability contestant is willing to accept a negative prize for ex-
erting a negative effort to maintain his individual rationality constraint. The
contest designer can use the additional budget as a result of this negative
prize to incentivize the higher ability contestant to exert more effort. Due to
the ability difference, the increase in the effort of the higher ability contes-
tant must dominate the decrease in the effort of the lower ability contestant.
Therefore, the total effort must increase. As we let the prizes of the lower
ability contestants go to negative infinity, the additional budget created for
incentivizing the higher ability ones goes to positive infinity. By doing this,
an infinite amount of total effort can be generated. Now effort must be non-
negative. This limits the amount of negative prizes that can be imposed on
the lower ability contestants to satisfy their individual rationality constraints.
This in turn limits the amount of additional budget that can be generated to
incentivize the high ability ones. Therefore, the amount of effort that can be
moved from the lower ability contestants to the higher ability ones becomes
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restricted. We obtain a tight upper bound bV for the total effort in Lemma
1.3.
In those K-mechanisms (Definition 1.1), the individual rationality con-
straint of a lower ability contestant can be maintained by awarding him with
a positive prize most of the time but punishing him with a large negative prize
with a small probability. The punishment can increase unboundedly as the
probability of punishment shrinks to zero. There is a cut-off in the support of
a contestant’s ability. A contestant with an ability below the cut-off pays an
entry fee K. He exerts no effort, and when all contestants have abilities lower
than this cut-off, he wins a positive prize K + Λ(K). A contestant with an
ability higher than the cut-off exerts positive effort. He also pays K, but he
wins V +NK if he has the highest ability among all contestants. A higher K
strengthens the incentive for a higher ability contestant to exert more effort.
But if a lower ability contestant is asked to pay a higher fee, the probability
of the event that he ends up with purely paying the fee must be decreased,
implying that the cut-off in ability must move higher. We show that the con-
test designer always benefits from such trade off and can induce more effort
with a larger K. When K goes to infinity, the utmost level of effort bV is
asymptotically achievable.
Note that this result is related to the literature on full surplus extraction in
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auctions. Cre´mer and McLean [15] and McAfee and Reny [34] establish that
the full surplus from the bidders can be extracted when their types are corre-
lated. (Heifetz and Neeman [23] and Chen and Xiong [13] further examine the
generality and robustness of the full surplus extraction result.) However, when
the types of the bidders are independently distributed and when the interim
individual rationality constraints must be satisfied, it is believed that full sur-
plus extraction cannot be achieved. In this paper, we show that if negative
prizes are allowed, then the upper bound total effort can almost be achieved
in the contest environment when the types of the contestants are distributed
independently and when the interim individual rationality constraints are sat-
isfied. This upper bound total effort is, in some sense, more than the full
surplus extraction in auctions. It is the total effort achievable when all (or
at least one) contestants have the maximum ability b with certainty. The full
surplus in auctions is much lower than what the seller can receive when all
bidders have the maximum valuation with certainty. From this, we can see
that an optimal contest problem can be very different from an optimal auction
problem.9
9While we obtain the utmost total effort under the condition of independent private abil-
ities, we still assume risk neutrality, unlimited liability, no collusion among the contestants,
and no competing designers. Therefore, the critics on full rent extraction by Robert [49],
Laffont and Martimort [27], Che and Kim [12], and Peters [45] still apply.
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1.4 Optimal contest design with bounded neg-
ative prize
The previous section establishes a surprising finding that the utmost total ef-
fort bV can be achieved asymptotically when we use increasing negative prizes.
It is not difficult to imagine that large negative prizes are not practical. Con-
testants do not have an infinite amount of wealth to pay for the negative prizes.
Furthermore, large negative prizes may not be lawful. In this section, we in-
vestigate the optimal contest design problem when there is a bound on the
negative prizes. Following the mechanism design literature, we assume that a
contestant’s ability distribution satisfies the following regularity condition to
simplify the characterization of the optimal contest.10
Assumption 1. The virtual ability function J(t) = t − 1−F (t)
f(t)
is strictly in-
creasing in t ∈ [a, b].
In the auction literature, a bidder’s virtual valuation can be interpreted as
the marginal revenue that can be elicited from a bidder (cf. Bulow and Roberts
[11]). In our contest setting, a contestant’s virtual ability can be similarly
interpreted as the marginal effort that can be elicited from a contestant using
10See Myerson [41]. Note that the results in the previous section does not require this
assumption. This regularity condition will be discussed further at the end of this section.
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one unit of prize.
In the following subsections, we will first set up the optimal contest design
problem, and then carry out the analysis through a few steps.
1.4.1 Problem (P-K)
Let K be the bound on the negative prizes, where K > 0.11 We add this
restriction to the original Problem (P),
vi(t) ≥ −K, ∀t,∀i, (1.22)
and we call this the bounded negative prize optimization problem (P-K). We
will focus our analysis on this problem in this section. Note that when K =∞,
the analysis in the previous section applies.
We adopt a multi-step procedure to solve optimization problem (P-K).
Here is our road map for solving this problem. First, we consider a re-
laxed problem of problem (P-K), denoted by problem (P-K-Relax), and es-
tablish some necessary conditions for the optimization. Second, we add these
necessary conditions to the constraints of problem (P-K-Relax) and obtain
an equivalent problem of the relaxed problem, denoted by problem (P-K-
Relax-Equivalent). Note that the optimal solutions of problems (P-K-Relax)
and (P-K-Relax-Equivalent) are the same. Third, we further relax problem
11The case for K = 0 is trivial. It is equivalent to optimal auction design and Myerson’s
result applies. We obtain this degenerate case when we let K go to zero in our analysis.
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(P-K-Relax-Equivalent) and examine problem (P-K-Relax-Equivalent-Relax).
Fourth, we fully characterize the solution to problem (P-K-Relax-Equivalent-
Relax). Finally, we construct a feasible mechanism of the original problem (P-
K) that achieves the maximal effort level of problem (P-K-Relax-Equivalent-
Relax). This feasible mechanism becomes an optimal mechanism.
In problem (P-K), any feasible Vi(ti) is nonnegative and increasing.
12 Thus,
we define tˆi = sup{ti|Vi(ti) = 0}. Without loss of generality, assume that
Vi(ti) is left-continuous at tˆi. Therefore, Vi(ti) = 0 for ti ≤ tˆi and Vi(ti) > 0
for ti > tˆi.
1.4.2 Problem (P-K-Relax)
We start our analysis by considering the following relaxed optimization prob-







[J(ti)− t0] vi(t)f(t)dt+t0V (1.23)















vi(ti, t−i)f−i(t−i)dt−i > 0, ∀ti > tˆi,∀i, (1.26)
vi(t) ≥ −K, ∀t,∀i, (1.27)
a ≤ tˆi ≤ b,∀i. (1.28)
This is a relaxed problem of problem (P-K). This is because the objective
functions are the same in both problems, and the constraints are less restrictive
than those in problem (P-K). To see this, constraint (1.24) follows from (1.6) by
integrating over t. Constraints (1.25) and (1.26) directly follow the definition
of tˆi. Constraint (1.27) is the same as (1.22) in (P-K). Constraint (1.28) allows
for all possible threshold values of tˆi.
We next characterize a key property for the optimal solutions {v~i (t), tˆ~i ,∀i}
of problem (P-K-Relax). Consider problem (P-K-Relax) for a fixed tˆi = tˆ
~
i . We
construct the Lagrangian by introducing multipliers λ for constraint (1.24),
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ξi(t) [vi(t) +K] f(t)dt.
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the optimization are:
ςi(t) = [J(ti)− t0]− λ+ µi(ti) + ξi(t) = 0,∀t,∀i,


















vi(t)f−i(t−i)dt−i ≥ 0, and µi(ti)
∫
t−i
vi(t)f−i(t−i)dt−i = 0,∀ti, ∀i,
ξi(t) ≥ 0, vi(t) +K ≥ 0, and ξi(t) [vi(t) +K] = 0,∀t,∀i.
These Kuhn-Tucker conditions lead to the following important necessary
conditions for the optimal solutions {v~i (t), tˆ~i , ∀i} for problem (P-K-Relax).
Lemma 1.5. (i) tˆ~i ≥ F−1(( KV+NK )
1
N−1 );
(ii) For ti > tˆ
~
i , we must have 0 < V
~
i (ti) ≤ (V +NK)FN−1(ti)−K.
1.4.3 Problem (P-K-Relax-Equivalent)
Lemma 1.5 provides a set of necessary conditions for the optimal solution of
(P-K-Relax). If we add these necessary conditions to the constraints in (P-
K-Relax), we obtain a revised optimization problem (P-K-Relax-Equivalent).
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The solutions to these two problems are the same. This is because the opti-
mal solution of (P-K-Relax) must satisfy all of the constraints (the original
feasibility constraints and the additional necessary conditions) in problem (P-
K-Relax-Equivalent). Thus the solution to problem (P-K-Relax-Equivalent)
cannot be worse than problem (P-K-Relax). Meanwhile, problem (P-K-Relax-
Equivalent) is more restrictive and therefore its solution cannot be better than
problem (P-K-Relax).














Vi(ti)f(ti)dti ≤ V, (1.30)
Vi(ti) = 0, if ti ≤ tˆi,∀i, (1.31)






N−1 ) ≤ tˆi ≤ b, ∀i, (1.33)
0 < Vi(ti) ≤ (V +NK)FN−1(ti)−K, if ti > tˆi , ∀i. (1.34)
Note that (1.30) simply rewrites (1.24).
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1.4.4 Problem (P-K-Relax-Equivalent-Relax)
Problem (P-K-Relax-Equivalent) can be relaxed to problem (P-K-Relax-Equi-
valent-Relax) by dropping constraint (1.32). As a result, the entire optimiza-
tion problem now depends only on the expected prizes Vi(·) instead of the













Vi(ti)f(ti)dti ≤ V, (1.36)
0 < Vi(ti) ≤ (V +NK)FN−1(ti)−K, if ti > tˆi , ∀i, (1.37)






N−1 ) ≤ tˆi ≤ b, ∀i. (1.39)
Note that in problem (P-K-Relax-Equivalent-Relax), the choice variables
are merely {Vi(·), tˆi,∀i}. Recall that t∗(K) = max{J−1(t0), tˆ(K)} where




N−1 ) are defined in Subsection 3.3. We are now ready
to present the following lemma, which is the key to the analysis of the optimal
contest mechanism with bounded negative prize.
Lemma 1.6. ∀i, let V¯i(ti) =
{
(V +NK)FN−1(ti)−K, if ti > t∗(K),
0, if ti ≤ t∗(K).
Then {V¯i(ti),∀i} is an optimal solution to problem (P-K-Relax-Equivalent-
Relax).
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Note that (P-K-Relax-Equivalent-Relax) is a relaxed problem of (P-K).
Suppose that we find a v¯i(t) such that it generates V¯i(ti) and satisfies the
constraints in the original problem (P-K). Then {v∗i (t), i = 1, 2, ..., N} and the
effort functions {e∗i (t), i = 1, 2, ..., N} that support v¯i(t) and satisfy ui(a, a) =
0,∀i would constitute an optimal solution to problem (P-K). The supporting
effort functions {e∗i (t), i = 1, 2, ..., N} can be constructed based on (1.9) with
ui(a, a) = 0.
The mechanism described in Definition 1.1 and Lemma 1.4 in Subsection
3.3, (v∗(·;K), e∗(·;K)), meets the above requirements. The following proposi-
tion illustrates that this mechanism is in fact an optimal contest mechanism.
Proposition 1.2. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then the mechanism
(v∗(·;K), e∗(·;K)) of Definition 1.1 is an optimal contest mechanism for prob-
lem (P-K).
In this optimal contest mechanism, the contest designer gives the highest
reward to the highest ability contestant. If negative prizes are not allowed,
the optimal prize structure is to allocate the entire prize to the highest ability
contestant provided that his ability is higher than J−1(t0). When negative
prizes are allowed, the contest designer tries to make prize transfers across
the contestants. The marginal benefit (in terms of effort generated) of giving
one extra dollar to the contestant with the highest ability is higher than the
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marginal cost (in terms of effort lost) of charging one dollar from the lower abil-
ity contestants (i.e., negative prize), since the marginal cost of effort is lower
for a contestant with a higher ability. Therefore, the highest ability contestant
exerts more effort and the lower ability contestants exert less. Since these
marginal benefit and marginal cost are both constant, the contest designer is
willing to perform this transfer as long as it is feasible, until the negative prize
hits its bound K. Meanwhile, the contest designer is constrained by the par-
ticipation constraints of the lower ability contestants and needs to compensate
them for the negative prizes charged. The optimal way to achieve this balanc-
ing is to reward the contestants when they are all of low abilities, i.e., when
their abilities are all lower than the cut-off t∗(K). When K becomes larger,
the low ability contestants need to be rewarded with positive prizes more often
to satisfy their participation constraints, and therefore t∗(K) becomes larger.
When K goes to infinity, the contestants who exert positive effort are only
those with abilities converging to the upper bound b. In this way, the utmost
total effort can be achieved. In this case, even though the contestant with
the highest ability which is also higher than the cutoff t∗(K) earns a positive
informational rent (Lemma 1.4), it is more and more difficult to be qualified,
and thus the ex ante expected total surplus that each contestant will earn
converges to zero.
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There are a few distinctive features associated with the prize allocation
rule in this optimal contest mechanism. First, a maximal negative prize is
imposed on all contestants except the one with the highest ability, unless all
of them have abilities lower than the cut-off.
Second, when all of the contestants have abilities lower than the cut-off,
they are all treated equally, regardless of their ability rankings. In this case,
they all obtain an equal positive prize (or equivalently, they have equal prob-
ability of winning one indivisible prize). These two features together ensure
that the maximum incentive is granted to the highest ability contestant to ex-
ert effort while the lower ability contestants are still willing to participate (and
provide the necessary cross-ability subsidies to the highest ability contestant).
Third, similarly to the cut-off type in Myerson [41], a cut-off value t∗(K) is
determined in our analysis, but in a somewhat different way. The cut-off value
in our optimal contest mechanism is always weakly higher than the one in
Myerson [41], and strictly higher if the maximum negative prize is sufficiently
high. In particular, our cut-off value would approach the upper limit of the
support of the ability distribution when the bound for negative prize becomes
higher and higher.
Fourth, when the bound of negative prize is low and the negative prizes are
not allowed to be large, our cut-off value coincides with the one in Myerson
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[41]. In this case, only a portion of the original prize budget is awarded to
the contestants when every contestant’s ability is below the threshold. This is
necessary in the maintenance of the incentive constraints for those contestants
with abilities above the cut-off. This partial award scheme in our optimal
contest design resembles the no-sale situation in an optimal auction when all
bidders’ virtual values are below the seller’s valuation, even when some of their
true valuations are higher than the seller’s valuation.
The following corollary specifies the exact condition for the prize budget
V to be always completely awarded to the contestants in the optimal contest.
Corollary 1.1. The prize budget V is always completely awarded to the con-
testants of every type profile when and only when K > 0 and J(tˆ(K)) ≥ t0.
When K = 0, or when K > 0 but J(tˆ(K)) < t0, the budget constraint
is not binding in the case where every ti is lower than t
∗(K). Note that this
result may hold even when the contest designer does not derive any benefit
from any unspent prize budget, i.e. when t0 = 0.
The optimal contest design discussed above can resemble some more famil-
iar form of contests. It can be implemented by a modified all-pay auction with
entry fees and minimum bids of effort. Define e(K) = limti→t∗+ ε(ti;K), where
ε(ti;K) is given by (1.21) and is the expected effort of type ti in the optimal
mechanism. We have the following proposition.
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Proposition 1.3. The optimal contest mechanism (v∗(·;K), e∗(·;K)) can be
implemented by a modified all-pay auction with an entry fee K and a minimum
bid e(K). Every participant pays the entry fee no matter whether he bids
or not. The highest bidder wins V plus the entry fees collected from all of
the participants. When no one bids, a participant is randomly selected as
the winner of the prize NΛ(K) (≤ V ) plus the collected entry fees. Every
contestant of every type participates in this all-pay auction.
Proof: It is straightforward to verify that every type of contestants will pay
K and participate. For abilities above t∗(K), the optimal bid (in terms of
effort) is given by the above expected effort function ε(·;K). Contestants with
abilities below t∗(K) participate but do not bid. 
Entry fees are used in both auctions and contests. There is one difference,
however, that sets them apart. In auctions, entry fees are often adopted to
screen bidders and contribute directly to the seller’s revenue. In contests,
however, entry fees are often collected and added to the prize budget, boosting
contestants’ effort indirectly through the enhanced incentive schemes.13
It is worthwhile to emphasize that the optimal contest in Proposition 1.3
13Entry fees in auctions have been analyzed by Fullerton and McAfee [19] as an instrument
of shortlisting contestants in an R&D tournament. In their paper, the entry fees collected
are used by the sponsor to offset the cost of the tournament winner’s prize. Recently, Ghosh
and McAfee [21] find that free entry is dominated by taxing entry (which is a form of entry
fees) in crowdsourcing tournaments, a conclusion echoed by our paper, though in a different
environment.
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does not require the prize V to be divisible. If the prize is indivisible, winning
a proportion of a grand prize for sure is equivalent to winning the whole grand
prize with a smaller probability.
An optimal mechanism for a smaller K must also be feasible when K be-
comes larger. We can therefore conclude that the expected total effort elicited
from problem (P-K) must be increasing in K. When K = 0, no negative prizes
are allowed in the contest. In this case, the constraints in the contest design
problem (P-K) are more restrictive than those in the optimal auction design,
as negative effort is not allowed in contests but negative payments are allowed
in auctions. However, the contest designer can do equally well in this case sim-
ply because the Myerson optimal auction does not involve negative monetary
payments. The above results are formalized in the following corollary.
Corollary 1.2. (i) The expected total effort elicited in the optimal contest
mechanism of problem (P-K) increases in K.
(ii) When K = 0, the optimal contest mechanism resembles the Myerson
optimal auction. In particular, when J(a) ≥ t0, the optimal contest mechanism
can be implemented by a standard all-pay auction with a single prize V for the
winner.
Note that the all-pay auction in (ii) of the above corollary is the same as
the optimal mechanism obtained by Moldovanu and Sela [36].
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As a final remark, we provide an illustration for why the monotonicity of
the virtual ability function is required for the case of bounded K but not for
the case of unbounded K. For the case of bounded K, the optimal mechanism
of (v∗(·;K), e∗(·;K)) in Definition 1.1 rewards the highest ability contestant
with the entire (enhanced) budget if his ability is above the cut-off t∗(K). The
optimality of the mechanism thus requires the virtual ability function to be
monotone increasing in a contestant’s ability. If this monotonicity requirement
is dropped, we expect that the ironing technique in Myerson [41] can be utilized
in characterizing the optimal contest mechanism.
For the case of unbounded K, the optimal contest mechanism does not
exist, and we show that mechanism (v∗(·;K), e∗(·;K)) can achieve a total
effort that is arbitrarily close the the utmost effort bV with no monotonicity
requirement. This is because the virtual ability function J(·) is continuous
and always reaches its maximum at the maximum ability b. As K goes to
infinity, the cut-off type t∗ goes to b. This guarantees the winner’s virtual
ability asymptotically approaching the highest virtual ability even without
monotonicity in the virtual ability function.
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1.5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we examine the design of optimal contests in an environment
with multiple contestants under private ability information. In the case of
bounded negative prizes, we completely characterize the optimal contest mech-
anism under a regularity condition on the virtual ability function. In the case
of unbounded negative prizes, the optimality can only be approached but not
reached, and therefore an optimal contest does not exist. We construct a
sequence of “almost” optimal contests, indexed by the magnitude of the al-
lowable negative prizes.
We adopt a mechanism design approach to accommodate all possible prize
allocation rules. Our analysis allows for both positive and negative prizes
within a fixed prize budget. We find that the utmost total effort can be
achieved in the limit when the size of negative prizes becomes larger and
larger. In the limit, the utmost total effort is induced and all surpluses from the
contestants are extracted. It is noteworthy that this (almost) full extraction
result and the (almost) obtainability of the utmost effort are derived in an
environment of independent private information, in contrast to related results
in the auction literature which requires correlated private information.
Compared to an optimal auction mechanism, one distinct feature of the
optimal contest mechanism is the cross-type transfers as the prizes assigned
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to contestants of different virtual abilities are being leveraged to achieve the
efficiency of the contest. The assumption of linear effort cost function plays
an important role in these transfers. This assumption is often adopted for
tractability in the literature, e.g., Moldovanu and Sela [37], Polishchuk and
Tonis [47] and Kirkegaard [25], among many others. If effort cost function is
convex as in Minor [35], then such transfers will become more and more costly,
and only a level lower than the utmost effort can be achieved.
To some extent, the negative prizes in our model have to be in the form
of advanced payments, such as entry fees. If no advanced payment is allowed,
then the appropriate individual rationality constraints should be the ex post
ones. This would render negative prizes infeasible. In that case, every contes-
tant of every type must earn a nonnegative payoff in every profile, implying
that the prizes cannot be negative. Therefore, the optimal contest becomes
Myerson’s optimal auction.
In the analysis, we focus on deriving the optimal mechanism that maximizes
the total expected effort from all players. Alternative objective functions for
the contest designer can be examined. For example, the contest designer may
value only the highest effort among the contestants, such as in innovation
contests. In our optimal mechanism, only the highest ability player may exert
a positive effort. It follows immediately that our mechanism is also the optimal
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mechanism when the contest designer values only the highest effort from the
contestants.
Our current study provides a few directions for future research. First,
in the analysis, we consider only symmetric contestants. It is worthwhile to
investigate how to generalize the analysis to accommodate asymmetric contes-
tants. Second, in the optimal contest with bounded negative prizes, we assume
a common and fixed bound for the negative prizes. In some situations, this
bound could be heterogenous among the contestants. Furthermore, this bound
could even be a contestant’s private information. It would be of interest to
investigate how the optimal leveraging on different virtual abilities should be
arranged. Third, similarly to the optimal auctions with risk averse bidders (cf.
Maskin and Riley [33]), one can investigate the optimal contest design prob-
lem with risk averse contestants. Fourth, our current analysis focuses on an
environment with pure adverse selection. Extending the analysis to a setting
of adverse selection and moral hazard may yield additional insights.
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Chapter 2




A contest is a situation where contestants exert costly and irreversible efforts
in hopes of winning a prize. Many economic activities can be seen as contests,
such as political elections, R&D races, rent-seeking games, sports competitions
and so on. Maximizing the total efforts is usually one of the main objectives
of the contest organizer.
Certain features in real-life contests could lead to negative prizes for the
contestants. A prominent example is entry fee, which is widely adopted in
contests. For instance, in the FCC-organized contest to set the standard for
high-definition television, all firms enter the contest by paying a 200, 000 entry
fee (cf. Taylor [55]). A firm that enters but not winning the contest thus ends
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up with a negative prize. In addition, the entry fees collected often constitute
a significant portion of the final prizes to be awarded. For example, in many
professional tournaments such as golf, sailing, chess and horse racing, the con-
testants need to pay significant membership fees, registration fees, nomination
fees and/or starting fees, which will be topped up to the original prize budget.
Again, the loser in such contests can be seen as receiving a negative prize.
As another example mentioned in chapter one of this thesis, in certain poker
tournaments, in order to compete, a player needs to pay a “buy-in,” which
is an upfront payment that goes towards the winning prize pool (cf. chapter
one of this thesis). In this case, this “buy-in” becomes the negative prize if a
player loses in the game.
It is also often the case that the contestant has his own private information,
such as his ability, valuation for the prize, talent and so on. In this paper, we
investigate the optimal prize allocation rule to elicit the highest expected total
efforts under such kind of asymmetric information and when negative prize is
allowed.
In our model, there is a pool of risk neutral potential contestants. Each
of them has an ability (type) which is his own private information, indepen-
dently drawn from the same distribution. The organizer has a fixed budget
V to maximize the expected total efforts from these potential contestants by
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designing the prize allocation rule.
Since prizes can be negative, relatively low ability contestants may not
enter the contest. As such, negative prize could lead to endogenous entry
though there is no entry cost. The contestant makes his participation and
effort decisions simultaneously.1 Then the prize allocation rule can depend on
the number of entrants. For convenience, call the situation when there are n
entrants as scenario n. The organizer determines for each scenario the sum of
prizes and the prize for each rank position with higher rank associated with
higher prize.2 This pins down the prize allocation rule which consists of two
vectors: the budget vector, which is the sum of prizes in each scenario, and the
prize allocation vector, which specifies the prize allocation in each scenario.
The complexity of the organizer’s problem comes from the fact that the
organizer has to provide the contestants incentive to participate and extract
surplus at the same time. The former one results from the introduction of
negative prize which could lead to endogenous entry. The latter one is the or-
ganizer’s central interest. These two are conflicting effects: Providing incentive
1This means the contestant exerts effort without knowing the number of entrants. As will
be mentioned in footnote 7, if the contestants observe the number of rival(s), the optimal
contest rule remains the same if the contestant exerts effort after paying the entry fee. Note
that it is easy to see that observing the number of entrants is weakly dominated from the
organizer’s viewpoint as there are more constraints.
2For example, for scenario n, the organizer sets the sum of prizes in that scenario which
has to be no greater than her budget, and prize for each rank from the first place to the
n’th place. Note that we allow the prize to be positive, zero or negative.
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means the organizer has to set more positive prizes to subsidize the relatively
low ability contestants, but this will lead to less surplus for her. Endogenous
entry further complicates the problem since now the prize allocation rule can
be contingent on the number of entrants. It is not immediately clear that
in which scenario the organizer should set negative prize for the lowest rank,
because negative prize for the lowest rank in some scenario must come along
with positive prize for the lowest rank in some other scenario. Otherwise, the
participation constraint will be violated. Intuitively, setting negative prize for
the lowest rank could induce more efforts as the negative prize charged can be
topped up to higher ranks to motivate more able contestants to exert more ef-
forts. Therefore, the organizer is facing the problem of choosing which scenario
to sacrifice (setting positive prizes for the low ranks) in order to extract more
surplus from some other scenario (setting negative prizes for the low ranks).
To analyze the organizer’s problem, we first show that the entrant adopts
pure strategies and there is no loss of generality to focus on threshold entry.3
Pure strategy then means that in equilibrium each entrant adopts a bidding
function. Threshold entry means there exists a threshold type such that all
types higher than it will enter with probability one, while types lower than it
will not participate for sure. We then proceed to characterize all the prize al-
3We focus on symmetric equilibrium in this paper.
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location rules that are compatible with any given entry threshold, and identify
the (unique) symmetric bidding function for any given fixed entry threshold
and any corresponding compatible prize allocation rule. Although the contes-
tant makes his choice of participation and effort simultaneously as he does not
observe the number of rival(s), the expected total efforts can be viewed as a
weighted average of expected total efforts from all scenarios, where the weight
is the probability of the corresponding scenario happening. The expected total
efforts in a scenario, which we call scenario expected total efforts, could be hy-
pothetically thought as the total efforts induced when the entrants exert effort
after knowing the number of rival(s). Note that such kind of decomposition of
the expected total efforts merely serves as a tool of understanding the effects
of different allocation rules. It does not mean that it is really the case that
the entrants know which scenario they are in.
Having equipped with the bidding function and the decomposition of total
efforts, we go on to characterize the optimal allocation rule when the budget
vector and the minimum prizes in all scenarios are fixed. The optimal prize
allocation for every scenario is to set all the prizes equal to the minimum prize
for ranks other than the first one, while the rest of the budget is placed on
the first rank position. The reason is that the scenario n expected total efforts
is a linear combination of the n prizes in scenario n, where the coefficient is
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related to the corresponding order statistics. The coefficient related to the
highest order statistics is the largest so that it is most effective to induce effort
from the highest ability entrant using one penny. Therefore, the organizer
should make the first prize as large as possible. This is the cross-type transfer :
transferring prize from the low rank to the highest one to induce more efforts,
which echoes the insight in Moldovanu and Sela [36]. Constrained by the
minimum prize in that scenario, the organizer has to set the prizes for all
other ranks as the minimum prize.
The optimal prize allocation rule for a fixed entry threshold is then pinned
down by varying across all possible combinations of minimum prizes for each
scenario (i.e., the prize for the lowest rank in each scenario). Intuitively, to have
a higher expected total efforts, the organizer should try to make the minimum
prizes in all scenarios as small as possible. In particular, the minimum prize
should be set as negative as possible. However, if the lowest prize in every
scenario is negative, then the expected prize the threshold type will obtain
will also be negative so that such type’s participation constraint is violated.
Thus, if the minimum prize in some scenario is negative, then it must be
the case that the minimum prize in some other scenario is positive. However,
setting a positive minimum prize in some scenario means a decrease of scenario
expected total efforts in that scenario. Then which scenario should she sacrifice
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in order to fulfil the participation constraint? By using the decomposition of
total efforts, it turns out that the higher the number of entrants is, the more
effective it is to induce efforts by one penny decrease of the minimum prize in
that scenario. This is rather intuitive since the higher the number of entrants n
is, the higher the probability that a high ability entrant being present will be.
And the competition when n is larger is more fierce. In particular, it is most
effective when there is full entry. Therefore, to maximize the expected total
efforts, the organizer should make the minimum prize when n < N as large
as possible so that the minimum prize in scenario N is the smallest possible.
Of course, the highest possible minimum prize in scenario n < N is V/n.
Therefore, the optimal minimum prize vector for any fixed entry threshold
is fully characterized. This is the cross-scenario transfer : transferring prize
from scenario N to all other scenarios to elicit more efforts in the presence
of participation constraint. The organizer will keep on doing such kind of
transfer as long as there is some scenario n < N such that the minimum prize
is strictly lower than V/n. We emphasize here again that the decomposition of
expected total efforts into N scenario expected total efforts and so the cross-
scenario transfer serve only as a way of understanding the effect of different
prize allocation rules on the expected total efforts inducible. The entrant
actually exerts effort without knowing the number of rival(s).
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In the optimal minimum prize vector, the minimum prize in scenario n < N
is V/n, which implies that the scenario n expected total efforts is zero. The
organizer sacrifices extracting surplus when the entry is not full. However,
she benefits from such sacrifice since now the minimum prize when there is
full entry is pushed to the limit so that she could extract the highest possible
surplus when there is full entry. This is due to the cross-scenario transfer.
With the optimal prize allocation rule ready for any fixed entry threshold,
the last step is to pin down the optimal entry threshold. We show that the
optimal entry threshold must lie in the interior, that is, full entry can never
be optimal. The optimal prize allocation rule can be implemented by the
following contest rule: Every entrant pays an optimally set entry fee K(> 0)
and make their bids. If everyone enters, the highest bidder wins V + NK;
If there are only n(< N) entrants, a winner is randomly drawn among the
entrants to be the winner of the prize V + nK.
The above optimum leads to negative prize ex post when there is full entry.
However, sometimes the contestant is protected by limited liability so that no
negative prize can be imposed on him. We show that when negative prize
is not allowed, the optimal contest induces full entry and it is the winner-
take-all in Moldovanu and Sela [36]. This is very intuitive since the driven
force of cross-scenario transfer is to ”move” prize from scenario N to all the
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other scenarios, which will lead to negative prize in scenario N . When there
is no negative prize, the cross-scenario transfer disappears so that the best the
organizer can do is winner-take-all as in Moldovanu and Sela [36].
Our results extend to the situation when the contestant incurs an entry
cost to participate in the contest. Both the cross-type transfer and the cross-
scenario transfer work in the same way as before so that the organizer faces
exactly the same trade-off as that when there is no entry cost. Therefore, the
optimal contest rule takes the same form.
Our paper belongs to the literature on optimal prize allocation in all-pay
auctions with incomplete information.4 It has been studied in various frame-
works starting from the seminal work of Moldovanu and Sela [36]. They show
the optimality of winner-take-all in contests under linearity assumptions. Mi-
nor [35] reexamines the same design problem as in Moldovanu and Sela [36]
when contestants have convex costs of effort and when the contest designer
has concave benefit of effort. Moldovanu and Sela [37] investigate the optimal
prize allocation problem in a two-stage all-pay auction framework. Mean-
while, Moldovanu et al. [38] study the optimal contest design in an all-pay
auction framework in which contestants care about their relative status. In
4There is another strand of literature which adopts the mechanism design approach to
study the optimal contest design with incomplete information, which includes Kirkegaard
[25], Polishchuk and Tonis [47], and chapter one of this thesis, among others.
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Moldovanu et al. [39] they study the optimal design of prizes that can be
positive or negative.
Among the aforementioned papers, our paper is most closely related to
Moldovanu and Sela [36] and Moldovanu et al. [39]. Our paper differentiates
from Moldovanu and Sela [36] in that negative prize is allowed in our model.
We model negative prize differently from Moldovanu et al. [39]. In their paper,
a negative prize, which they call punishment, is costly for the organizer to
implement. In our paper, similarly to Fullerton and McAfee [19], the money
collected from negative prizes from some contestants can be utilized by the
organizer to strengthen the incentives to other contestants. Since negative
prize can potentially lead to endogenous entry, our paper also explicitly takes
such effect into account.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2.2, we set up the
model. Section 2.3 analyzes the optimal contest rule. We discuss the effect of
limited liability and entry cost in section 2.4. Section 2.5 concludes. Technical
proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2.2 The Model
A risk neutral contest organizer has a fixed budget V (> 0) to elicit efforts
from N (≥ 2) risk neutral potential contestants. For contestant i, his cost
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of exerting effort ei is ei/ti, where ti is his private information. We assume
that ti’s are independently and identically distributed with the cumulative
distribution function F (·) on the support [a, b] with a > 0. The probability
density function f(·) is strictly positive on [a, b].
A contestant’s payoff is equal to the prize he receives minus the cost of
exerting effort. The organizer’s goal is to design a contest rule to maximize
the expected total efforts using her budget. She can use both positive and
negative prizes.
For convenience, call the scenario that there are n entrants as scenario n.5
A contest rule consists of two vectors V and W, called the budget vector and
prize allocation vector, respectively. Specifically, V = (V1, V2, . . . , VN) ∈ RN
is the vector of sum of prizes so that Vn ≤ V is the sum of prizes in scenario
n. W = (W1,W2, . . . ,WN) is the prize allocation vector, where Wn =
(wn,1, wn,2, . . . , wn,n) ∈ Rn with wn,1 ≥ wn,2 ≥ . . . ≥ wn,n and
∑n
j=1wn,j = Vn
is the prize allocation vector in scenario n.6 That is, wn,j is the prize for the
j’th place winner in scenario n. Note that wn,j can be negative. Ties are
broken randomly and fairly.
The timing of the game is as follows.
Time 0: F (·), N and V are revealed by nature as public information. Na-
5In this chapter, we use ”participant” and ”entrant” interchangeably.
6Here we abuse the term a little to call both W and Wn as the ”prize allocation vector”.
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ture draws type for each contestant.
Time 1: The organizer chooses V and W. And she commits to them. The
contest rule is announced.
Time 2: All the potential contestants decide whether or not to participate
in the contest. If a contestant decides to enter, he exerts effort without knowing
the number of participants.7
Time 3: The prizes are allocated according to the rule announced at time
1.
2.3 Analysis of the Optimal Contest Rule
As the contest rule satisfies the anonymity property, it is natural to focus on
symmetric equilibrium. Since the prize a contestant obtains can be negative, it
is likely that the contest rule induces endogenous entry.8 We shall first analyze
some properties of the effort provision function.
7If the organizer announces the number of participants so that the participants exert
effort after knowing the number of rival(s), then the optimal contest rule remains unchanged
if the contest is held after the entrants have paid the entry fee. See Remark 2.1 and Remark
2.2.
8To see this, suppose that the lowest prize in every scenario is negative, then the lowest
type contestant always gets the lowest prize, which yields a negative expected payoff.
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2.3.1 Equilibrium Analysis
Assume that (p, σ) is a symmetric (mixed strategy) Bayesian Nash equilibrium
in the original game, where p ∈ [0, 1] is the probability of entry.9 That is, for
contestant i with type ti, p(ti) and σ(·|ti) specify the probability of entry and
a distribution function over R+ if he enters, respectively. Specifically, σ(e|t) is
the probability that the contestant with type t exerts effort less than or equal
to e if he enters. Note that when p = 0, σ is not defined. Also note that if
p(t) > 0 for some t, then p(t′) > 0 for any t′ > t since the expected payoff
is weakly increasing in type as required by incentive compatibility. Define
t0 = inf{t : p(t) > 0}. Then for any t > t0, p(t) > 0 and σ(·|t) is well defined.
Let V˜ (e) be the expected prize an entrant obtains when his opponents are
using the strategy (p, σ). Denote the support of σ(·|t) as S(t), then every
e ∈ S(t) yields the same expected payoff for the entrant with type t given the
other contestants’ strategies (p, σ). That is, for any e1, e2 ∈ S(t), V˜ (e1)− e1t =
V˜ (e2)− e2t . Note that the effort provision strategy σ is only valid for the entrant.
The following four lemmas characterize the effort provision function.
It is intuitive that higher effort leads to higher prize. The following lemma
confirms this. (All the proofs are relegated to the appendix.)
9The existence of equilibrium is not an issue since the bidding function derived later
already gives an equilibrium.
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Lemma 2.1. Suppose e1, e2 ∈ ∪t>t0S(t) and e1 < e2, then V˜ (e1) ≤ V˜ (e2).
Our next result says that the support of different types cannot strictly
overlap. In other words, their supports can only intersect at the boundary.
Lemma 2.2. For any two types t1, t2 > t0 with t1 < t2, there does not exist
e1 ∈ S(t1) and e2 ∈ S(t2) such that e1 > e2.
Lemma 2.3. For any t > t0, S(t) is a singleton so that it is a function.
Moreover, S(t) is strictly increasing in t > t0 or is equal to zero for all t > t0.
According to the above lemma, every entrant uses pure strategy, thus con-
stitutes a bidding function. The bidding function is always zero when all the
prizes are equal in any scenario that happens with positive probability (i.e.,
wn,1 = wn,n if scenario n happens with positive probability), while it is strictly
increasing if there is some scenario (say scenario n) that happens with positive
probability such that wn,1 > wn,n. The reason for the latter case is simple: an
infinitesimal increase in effort would yield a discrete jump in the expected prize
obtained so that pooling would never happen. The following lemma further
identifies the boundary condition of the bidding function.
Lemma 2.4. Type t0 must bid zero.
We will focus on threshold entry in this paper. Threshold entry means that
there exists a threshold tc such that types higher than tc enter with probability
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one, while types lower than it enter with zero probability. In fact, there is no
loss of generality to focus on threshold entry. This results from Lemma 2.3 and
the fact that higher type has higher expected payoff as required by incentive
compatibility. Since the number of participants can be endogenous and since
the prize can be negative, the organizer can decompose the problem into two
steps. She first fixes the entry threshold at tc and solves for the optimal
contest rule. Then varying across all tc ∈ [a, b) will give her the optimal entry
threshold and hence the optimal contest rule.10 We shall first analyze the first
step.
2.3.2 The Optimal Contest Rule for Fixed Threshold tc
For threshold entry tc, only contestants with type t ≥ tc will enter. If tc > a,
then the entrant faces a stochastic number of rivals. An entrant knows that
his rivals’ types are independently drawn from the truncated CDF G(t, tc) =
F (t)−F (tc)
1−F (tc) , with density function g(t, t
c) = f(t)
1−F (tc) , t ∈ [tc, b]. According to
Lemma 2.3, all entrants use pure strategies. We shall first derive the entrant’s
effort bidding function and the expected total efforts inducible for any fixed
(V,W), and then we go on to pin down the optimal contest rule. To this end,
we first derive the effort bidding function ignoring participation constraint for
10Note that tc = b just means the organizer cancels the contest, which yields a total efforts
of zero.
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a fixed number of entrants.
The Bidding Function without PC
Suppose there are n entrants and the lowest type (i.e., tc) bids zero, suppose
further that the prize allocation vector is Wn = (wn,1, wn,2, . . . , wn,n) with
wn,1 ≥ wn,2 ≥ . . . ≥ wn,n and
∑n
j=1wn,j = Vn, where wn,j is the prize for the
j’th place winner. We first derive the (unique) symmetric bidding function
e(n)(t,Wn, t
c) with e(n)(tc,Wn, t
c) = 0 without taking into account the partic-
ipation constraint, as well as the expected total efforts. The following lemma
gives the characterization.
Lemma 2.5. Given the prize allocation vector Wn = (wn,1, wn,2, . . . , wn,n)
with wn,1 ≥ wn,2 ≥ . . . ≥ wn,n,
1) The unique symmetric bidding function e(n)(t,Wn, t
c) satisfying
e(n)(tc,Wn, t
c) = 0 is given by
e(n)(t,Wn, t














is the expected prize an entrant with type t obtains.





J(t)V (n)(t)g(t, tc)dt− ntcwn,n,
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where J(t) = t− 1−F (t)
f(t)
.
Having equipped with the expressions for the unique symmetric bidding
function and the expected total efforts under any prize allocation vector Wn,
we are ready to derive the symmetric bidding function for a contestant with
type t ≥ tc and who is not aware of the number of entrants. Here we emphasize
that the above lemma servers only as a tool to derive the bidding function of
a contestant who decides to enter. It does not imply that the entrant knows
which scenario he is in.
The Entrant’s Bidding Function
Suppose that a contestant’s type is above the threshold so that he will en-
ter. We need to derive his bidding strategy when he is uncertain of the
number of rivals. According to Lemma 2.3, he will use pure strategy. To
make a bid, the entrant can go through the following reasoning: ”If I am
in scenario n where the prize allocation vector is Wn, and I am forced to
stay in the contest, then if the other n − 1 rivals are bidding according to
e(n)(t,Wn, t
c), then it is optimal for me to bid according to e(n)(t,Wn, t
c) as
well by Lemma 2.5. I also understand that the probability that I am in sce-










c) would be my best choice if others are do-
ing so”. The following proposition shows that e(t,W, tc) is indeed the (unique)
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symmetric bidding function.
Proposition 2.1. Suppose the prize allocation vector is W = (W1,W2, . . . ,WN)
and the entry threshold is tc, where Wn = (wn,1, wn,2, . . . , wn,n), 1 ≤ n ≤ N ,
then










FN−n(tc)(1−F (tc))n−1 and e(n)(t,Wn, tc) is given in Lemma
2.5.








(1− F (tc))nFN−n(tc)TE(n)(Wn, tc),
where TE(n)(Wn, t
c) is given in Lemma 2.5.
The entrant’s bidding function can be equivalently seen as a weighted av-
erage of his individual bidding function in each scenario, where the weight
is the probability of that scenario happening from his perspective. In other
words, we may understand it as a two-step procedure. In the first step, the
entrant first figures out his bidding function if he is in scenario n where his
participation constraint is ignored, which is characterized in Lemma 2.5. In
the next step, he decides on his effort level by taking a weighted average of all
the N bidding functions.
Such kind of decomposition of the entrant’s bidding function into scenario
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bidding ones will facilitate our analysis of the effects of the allocation of prizes
in some scenario on the expected total efforts. Note that such decomposition
is not unique, however, the aggregate level e(t,W, tc) must be unique. Also
notice that TE(n)(Wn, t
c) is exactly the effort induced in scenario n if the
entrant can observe which scenario he is in and uses the scenario n bidding
strategy. The expected total efforts can be viewed as the weighted average
of all those scenario total efforts. We emphasize here again that such kind
of decomposition of the expected total efforts into N scenario expected total
efforts serves only as a way of understanding the effects of prize allocation rule
in every scenario on the expected total efforts. The entrant actually exerts
effort without knowing the number of rival(s).
The Optimal Contest Rule for Fixed tc
As mentioned above, we can treat the problem as if the entrants were making
N individual decisions on effort levels for the N scenarios and then aggregating



















pnwn,n = 0, (2.2)
where u(tc) is the expected payoff of the threshold type tc and TE(n)(Wn, t
c)
is given in Lemma 2.5.
Constraint (2.1) is the budget constraint. Constraint (2.2) is the partici-
pation constraint which says that the expected payoff for the threshold type
must be zero.11 Note that since the bidding function is weakly increasing,
incentive compatibility implies that all types higher than the threshold type
must have a nonnegative payoff.
For notation simplicity, we define Kn = wn,n, which is called the minimum
prize in scenario n. It is easy to see that Kn = wn,n ≤ Vn/n since wn,1 ≥
wn,2 ≥ . . . ≥ wn,n.
To solve for the optimal (V,W), we can first fix the the budget vector
V and wn,n satisfying (2.2) to solve for the optimal prize allocation vector
W. And then we vary across all possible V and wn,n to obtain the optimum.
In fact, when wn,n and the budget Vn for scenario n are both fixed for all
n, maximizing TE(W, tc) is equivalent to maximizing every TE(n)(Wn, t
c)
subject to (2.1). The following lemma characterizes the optimal scenario n
11If tc > a, then the threshold type tc must be indifferent between entering and leaving
so that his expected payoff is zero. When tc = a, u(a) ≥ 0 if and only if wN,N ≥ 0. Then
it reduces to the full entry with nonnegative prizes which has been analyzed in Moldovanu
and Sela [36]. In their paper, at the optimum, wN,N = 0. Therefore, there is no loss to
assume u(tc) = 0 for all tc.
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prize vector.








wn,j = Vn, with wn,n = Kn ≤ Vn
n
, (2.3)
where Kn is a fixed number, is given by wn,1 = Vn− (n− 1)Kn and wn,j = Kn
for all j ≥ 2.
Lemma 2.6 echoes Moldovanu and Sela [36]. Denote the density of the
i’th order statistics of the n i.i.d. random variables following CDF G(t, tc) as
g(i,n)(t, t






Gi−1(t, tc)(1−G(t, tc))n−ig(t, tc).
By Lemma 2.5, the expected total efforts in scenario n can be expressed as a












In the proof of Lemma 2.6, we show that
∫ b
tc
J(t)g(n+1−j,n)(t, tc)dt, the coeffi-




c)dt > 0. As a result, the
first prize, wn,1, is most effective in inducing the scenario n efforts. There-
fore, the organizer should make it as large as possible. This is the cross-
type transfer: transferring prizes from low type to enlarge the budget to be
63
awarded to the high type so as to induce more efforts. Constrained by (2.3),
the lowest prize an entrant can have is Kn so that the prize allocation vector
in the above lemma is optimal. Note that setting Kn = 0 goes back to the
winner-take-all result in Moldovanu and Sela [36].
Equipped with Lemma 2.6, the highest expected total efforts inducible
under V = (V1, V2, . . . , VN) and K = (K1, K2, . . . , KN) can be written as
12






J(t)(Vn − nKn)Gn−1(t, tc)g(t, tc)dt.
From here, it is easy to see that the expected total efforts is strictly increasing
in Vn so that at the optimum, Vn = V for all n ≥ 2.13 That is, the organizer
will always exhaust her budget when there are at least two entrants.
Thus, the final step to solve the optimal contest rule for fixed threshold
tc is to find the optimal minimum prize vector K. Formally, the organizer’s
problem now reduces to
max
K






J(t)(Vn − nKn)Gn−1(t, tc)g(t, tc)dt
subject to
Vn ≤ V, ∀n, with equality when n ≥ 2; (2.4)
12For the derivation, please refer to the appendix.
13If tc = a so that only KN matters, then the expected total efforts is constant in Vn,
n ≤ N − 1. However, in this case, there is no loss to assume that Vn = V for all n ≥ 2
as it does not affect the constraints (2.5) and (2.6) below. When n = 1, K1 = V1 so that
increasing V1 does not affect the expected total efforts. And changing V1 will affect both




,∀n, with equality when n = 1; (2.5)
N∑
n=1
pnKn = 0. (2.6)
The following proposition characterizes the optimal minimum prize vector.
Proposition 2.2. The optimal budget vector is V = (V, V, . . . , V ). And the
optimal minimum prize vector is given by K∗(tc) = (V, V
2











The intuition of Proposition 2.2 is as follows. We mentioned earlier that
although each entrant makes his effort level decision without knowing the
number of rivals, he could plan his effort as if he had N bidding functions,
with one for each scenario. Hypothetically, this would induce N scenario total
efforts. As such, the expected total efforts from the organizer’s viewpoint can
be regarded as a weighted average of these N scenario total efforts. Lowering
Kn (i.e., lowering the lowest prize wn,n in scenario n) will induce more scenario
n efforts by the cross-type transfer as the first prize in scenario n (wn,1) can
now be further enhanced. However, the organizer also needs to take care
of the threshold type’s participation constraint. A decrease of Kn must be
compensated by an increase of Km for some m 6= n. However, an increase
in Km will result in less scenario m total efforts again due to the cross-type
14When tc = a, pn = 0 for all n ≤ N − 1 so that only KN matters. In this case, the
optimal Kn for n ≤ N − 1 may not be unique as they do not enter the objective function.
However, when tc > a, the optimal minimum prize vector K is unique.
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transfer. Therefore, she faces a trade-off: an increase of total efforts in some
scenario comes along with a drop of total efforts in another scenario. Then
which scenario should she sacrifice? It turns out that the higher the number
of entrants is, the more effective it is to induce scenario total efforts using
one penny. This is rather intuitive as when the number of entrants is larger,
the expectation of the highest order statistics is higher, i.e., the probability
of a high type entrant being present is higher, and the competition among
entrants are more fierce. Therefore, the organizer should make Kn small for
large enough n. In particular, she should set KN to be as small as possible.
This is the cross-scenario transfer: transferring prize from scenario N to all
other scenarios in order to induce more expected total efforts. The organizer
should keep making such transfers across scenarios until the minimum prizes in
all other scenarios have hit their corresponding upper bound (i.e., Kn = V/n)
so that no more prize can be ”moved” from scenario N to any other scenarios
to induce more efforts.
Proposition 2.2 characterizes the optimal contest rule for any fixed thresh-
old tc: the budget vector V∗(tc) = (V, V, . . . , V ) and the prize allocation vec-
tor W∗(tc) = (W∗1(t
c),W∗2(t
c), . . . ,W∗N(t
c)), where W∗N(t




c), . . . , K∗N(t
c)) and W∗n(t
c) = (V/n, V/n, . . . , V/n) for
n ≤ N − 1. The following proposition provides one implementation.
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Proposition 2.3. The optimal contest rule for entry threshold tc is contingent
on the number of entrants and with entry fee −K∗N(tc); when there is full entry,
it is a winner-take-all with a grand prize of V − NK∗N(tc); when there are n
entrants with n < N , each participant is randomly drawn to be the winner for
the prize V − nK∗N(tc) with probability 1/n.
Remark 2.1. The above proposition is derived based on the assumption that
the participant exerts effort before knowing the number of entrants (i.e., the
designer conceals the number of participants. For convenience, call it policy
C.). If the participant exerts effort after knowing the number of entrants (i.e.,
the designer reveals the number of participants. For convenience, call it policy
R.), then the contest rule in Proposition 2.3 is still optimal if the contestant
exerts effort after paying the entry fee. To see this, note that in the optimal
contest rule characterized in Proposition 2.3, the entry fee −K∗N(tc) is uniform
for all entrants and that it is a sunk cost. After the entry fee is sunk, the contest
rule left guarantees that all the participants have a nonnegative expected utility
as the unique symmetric equilibrium in Lemma 2.5 is going to be played. Also
notice that in policy C both the bidding function and the expected total efforts
are the weighted average of the scenario counterparts. Therefore, the organizer
faces exactly the same trade-offs in both policies. The key here is that the
organizer can ignore the participation constraint in each scenario for policy R
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after the entry fee has been sunk. Thus, the contest rule with entry fee is also
optimal when the number of entrants is revealed.
2.3.3 The Optimal Contest Rule
Having characterized the optimal contest rule for any fixed entry threshold,
we are now ready to further identify the optimal entry threshold, hence the
optimal contest rule.
When choosing the optimal threshold tc, the organizer faces the following
trade-off. On the one hand, when tc is small, the probability of full entry
(scenario N) is high, while the bidding function in scenario N characterized
in Lemma 2.5 is uniformly small. One the other hand, when tc is large, the
opposite happens. In particular, when tc → a, the probability of full entry
tends to one, whereas when tc → b, the probability of full entry approaches
zero, while the bidding function in scenario N given in Lemma 2.5 approaches
infinity. As shown below, the expected total efforts goes to zero when tc → b.
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In fact, the highest expected total efforts for fixed tc is15









is the total effort level induced by the standard winner-take-all contest rule
in Moldovanu and Sela [36]. This also implies that if the organizer wishes to
induce full entry, then the best she can do is the winner-take-all contest rule
in Moldovanu and Sela [36]. When tc → b, K∗N(tc)→ −∞, but TE∗(tc)→ 0.
As a result, it is never optimal to set the threshold in the neighborhood of b.
Thus, there is no loss to consider entry threshold tc ∈ [a, b− ] to search for
the optimum, where  > 0 is sufficiently small. Since TE∗(tc) is continuous in
[a, b − ], the optimal threshold must exist. The following lemma shows that
the optimal entry threshold must be in the interior.
Lemma 2.7. Let the optimal threshold be tc∗. Then tc∗ ∈ (a, b).
Let the corresponding minimum prize in scenario N for tc∗ be K∗N(t
c∗).
15To see this, note that






J(t)(Vn − nKn)Gn−1(t, tc)g(t, tc)dt
= N(1− F (tc))N
∫ b
tc
J(t)(V −NK∗N (tc))GN−1(t, tc)g(t, tc)dt





Then as a direct consequence of Proposition 2.2 and Proposition 2.3, we have
the following proposition.
Proposition 2.4. 1) The optimal contest rule is given by: the budget vector
V∗(tc∗) = (V, V, . . . , V ) and the prize allocation vector
W∗(tc∗) = (W∗1(t
c∗),W∗2(t
c∗), . . . ,W∗N(t
c∗)),
where W∗N(t
c∗) = (V − (N − 1)K∗N(tc∗), K∗N(tc∗), K∗N(tc∗), . . . , K∗N(tc∗)) and
W∗n(t
c∗) = (V/n, V/n, . . . , V/n) for n ≤ N − 1.
2) It has the following implementation: The optimal contest rule is con-
tingent on the number of entrants and with entry fee −K∗N(tc∗); when there is
full entry, it is a winner-take-all with a grand prize of V − NK∗N(tc∗); when
there are n entrants with n < N , each participant is randomly drawn to be the
winner for the prize V − nK∗N(tc∗) with probability 1/n.
Remark 2.2. As a direct consequence of Remark 2.1, the optimal contest rule
characterized in the above proposition is also optimal when the participants first
pay the entry fee and then exert effort after knowing the number of rival(s).
2.4 Discussions
2.4.1 Limited Liability
The optimal contest rule in Proposition 2.4 could lead to a negative prize for
the participants ex post. When the contestant has limited liability (i.e., all the
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prizes must be nonnegative) so that the designer cannot charge the contestant,
what would the optimal contest rule be? The following proposition answers
this question.
Proposition 2.5. When the contestants are protected by limited liability, the
optimal contest rule induces full entry and reduces to winner-take-all contest
rule with prize V .
Proof: When there is limited liability, the lowest prize the organizer can set is
0 so that Kn ≥ 0 for all n. As long as Kn > 0 for some n, there must exist
some m such that Km < 0 so that the participation constraint (2.6) holds, a
contradiction. Therefore, Kn = 0 for all n, which is the winner-take-all contest
rule with prize V . 
To see why the optimal contest rule reduces to winner-take-all with full
entry, it is helpful to see how the no limited liability works to derive the optimal
contest rule in Proposition 2.4. In fact, when there is no limited liability, the
designer can charge the low type contestant to enlarge the grand prize to be
awarded to the highest type contestant. However, when the contestants are
protected by limited liability, the designer now cannot impose a negative prize
on the contestant so that the highest possible prize a contestant can obtain
will never exceed V . Thus, the cross-scenario transfer, which helps to enlarge
the grand prize for the highest ability entrant when there is full entry, is never
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present when limited liability kicks in. As a result, we are only left with cross-
type transfer so that the optimal contest rule is to induce full entry and adopt
winner-take-all.
As mentioned above, when the organizer wishes to induce full entry, the
lowest prize in scenario N is exactly zero. Combining with Proposition 2.5,
we have the following corollary which links to Moldovanu and Sela [36].
Corollary 2.1. If the organizer wishes to induce full entry or if the contestants
are protected by limited liability, the optimal contest rule reduces to winner-
take-all with prize V as in Moldovanu and Sela [36].
2.4.2 Costly Entry
Entry cost is a widely observed in reality.16 In order to enter a contest, a
contestant needs to incur a sunk cost. Such cost does not contribute to his
success in the contest. Our analysis extends to such setting as well. Suppose
every contestant incurs an entry cost c, where c ∈ [0, V/N). Here c < V/N
is to ensure that full entry is feasible if the organizer wishes to induce it.17
Then the only change of the analysis of the optimal contest rule is that now
the participation constraint changes to that the threshold type obtains an
16For example, entry cost can be the opportunity cost of participation, the cost of traveling
to the contest site, the accommodation fee, and so on.
17This assumption is natural as in reality the entry cost is often significantly smaller than
the prize budget.
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expected payoff of c instead of 0. Both the cross-type transfer and the cross-
scenario transfer work in exactly the same way as before. Therefore, for any
given entry threshold, the optimal contest rule takes the same form: winner-
take-all when there is full entry; randomly select a winner when the entry is
partial. Of course, then the optimal contest rule also takes the same form.
Thus, our main results are robust when there is entry cost.18
2.5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we characterize the optimal prize allocation rule in all-pay auc-
tions where the prize can be negative. Negative prize can potentially induce
endogenous entry so that the prize allocation can be contingent on the num-
ber of entrants. At the optimum, every entrant pays an optimally set entry
fee K(> 0) and make their bids. If everyone enters, the highest bidder wins
V + NK; If there are only n(< N) entrants, a winner is randomly drawn
among the entrants to be the winner of the prize V + nK. This results from
two transfer effects: the cross-type transfer and the cross-scenario transfer.
Our results are robust when the contestants incur a cost to enter the con-
test. When the contestants are protected by limited liability so that negative
prize cannot be imposed, the optimum reduces to the winner-take-all result in
18Of course, the optimal entry threshold and the entry fee collected are different when
there is entry cost.
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Procurement is ubiquitously employed as a cost-efficient way of acquiring
goods, services or works from an outside external source. It accounts for a
substantial part of the global economy. Averagely, around 15 percent of yearly
global domestic product (a total amount of over $10 trillion) is spent merely
through public procurement that covers in particular military acquisitions as
a significant component.1 It has long been recognized that procurement of
new goods/services often involves and stimulates private research and devel-
opment (R&D) and/or innovations before production and delivery (See Rob
1See p. 1 in “Supplement to the 2013 Annual Statistical Re-
port on United Nations Procurement: Procurement and Innovation”,
https://www.unops.org/SiteCollectionDocuments/ASR/ASR Supplement 2013 WEB.pdf
(accessed October 6, 2015). More details are avail-
able from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Procurement and
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government procurement (accessed October 6, 2015).
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[48], Hendricks, Porter, and Boudreau [24], Lichtenberg [30], Rogerson [50],
and Tan [54] among others).2 More recently, Nyiri et al. [43] emphasize the
promotion of R&D investment and innovation in Information and Communi-
cation Technology (ICT) by public procurement in EU member states. The
United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) in its 2013 report3 also
stresses the role played by public procurement on fostering investment in new
technology and research in both developed and developing countries.
Cost effectiveness has long been the central issue in procurement design.4
An established literature has been devoted to designing cost-minimizing acqui-
sition in a variety of environments. It is clear that the contractors’ pre-delivery
R&D incentive on cost reduction should be fully utilized by the procurers to
lower their acquisition costs. To achieve the most cost reduction, an optimal
procurement policy must appropriately balance between extracting surplus ex
post and providing the right R&D incentive ex ante.5
2Hendricks, Porter, and Boudreau [24] observe that in the federal auctions for leases
on the outer continental shelf (OCS), bidders make private investment to acquire more
information before bidding. Abundant empirical evidence in defense procurement indicates
that bidders make significant amount of private investments in R&D prior to bidding. Tan
[54] provides an example of jet fighter procurement by the U.S. Air Force. Lichtenberg [30]
provides more examples about private R&D investment in public defense procurement.
3“Supplement to the 2013 Annual Statistical Report on United Nations Procurement:
Procurement and Innovation”, 2014, www.unops.org.
4Rob [48] points out:“... the importance of the cost effectiveness in the acquisition process
cannot be overemphasized.”
5Notably, the contractors’ pre-delivery R&D incentive has been carefully incorporated
into the analysis in many pioneer studies including Rob [48], Dasgupta [17], Tan [54], Pic-
cione and Tan [46], Arozamena and Cantillon [2] among others.
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It is typically assumed in the literature that both the R&D effort and the
good/service delivery efficiency (i.e., the production cost) are a contractor’s
private information. However, the situations are abundant where the R&D
efficiency (e.g., the marginal cost of R&D effort) of a contractor is also his
private information. R&D activities require both technical facilities and re-
searchers with different expertise and specializations. The competency of the
contractor in organizing, coordinating and carrying out a specific R&D task
(e.g., the quality of its technical facilities, abilities and experience of its re-
searchers, its efficiency in project management) is usually not observable by
the procurer. An immediate implication is that the contractor’s R&D incen-
tive must respond to his R&D efficiency. Some interesting issues thus arise
for the procurement design. How does this additional dimension of private in-
formation of the agent affect his R&D incentive and consequently the optimal
design of procurement? In particular, how should the optimal design incor-
porate this new element in the information flow into the natural dynamics of
the procurement process? In this paper, we address these issues by studying
the cost minimizing procurement design in a two-stage environment from a
dynamic mechanism design perspective.
We consider a two-stage contract between a procurer (she, the principal)
and a supplier (he, the agent) in the following environment. The principal
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wishes to procure a product from the agent which she can acquire from an
alternative source at cost c0.
6 The agent can invest in R&D that improves his
endowed production technology and generates a production cost potentially
lower than c0. The agent’s ability of conducting R&D, which can be either
high (the efficient type) or low (the inefficient type), is his private information.
At the first stage, the agent is offered the contract. If he accepts, then he
exerts an unobservable effort in R&D. Each effort level leads to a distribution
of production cost. Higher effort generates a better distribution in the sense
of first-order stochastic dominance. But higher effort costs more given the
type of the agent. The first stage involves both adverse selection (the agent’s
R&D ability is his private information) and moral hazard (the agent’s effort
is not observed by the principal). Thus, the principal faces a mixed adverse
selection and moral hazard problem in the first stage. At the second stage, the
production cost is realized and it is again the agent’s private information. The
contract has to sequentially elicit the agent’s private information and provide
the right incentive for the agent to exert effort in R&D at the same time. The
principal’s goal is to design the optimal contract to minimize her expected
procurement cost.
We first provide a first-best benchmark analysis for the case where the
6c0 can be equivalently treated as the procurer’s value of the product.
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agent’s R&D effort is observable and his private information at both stages
is public. It is straightforward that the second stage allocation must be ex
post efficient and the R&D effort of both types must be efficient. First stage
transfers can be employed to extract all the surplus of each type of supplier.
We then investigate the dynamic pure adverse selection environment where
the R&D ability and the production efficiency are private information of the
agent but his R&D effort is contractible. We find that the optimal mechanism
induces no effort distortion for the efficient type and a downward distortion
for the inefficient type compared with the first-best effort levels, while the
second stage allocation remains ex post efficient for both types. This effort
downward distortion reflects the usual rent extraction-efficiency trade-off in the
adverse selection literature. Therefore, as in the first-best benchmark setting,
the efficient type invests more in the R&D stage at the optimum. However,
diverging from the insight from the dynamic adverse selection literature (e.g.,
Courty and Li [14] and Eso˝ and Szentes [18]), the second stage allocation is not
discriminatory. The intuition is as follows. Although the distribution of the
second stage delivery cost (which in turn is determined by the R&D effort) is
endogenously determined by the first stage type, it eventually becomes public
information as the R&D effort is observable. As a result, the principal can
solely rely on the first stage transfers to maintain the incentive compatibility
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without sacrificing the ex post efficiency in the second stage allocation.
We now turn to the main environment of interest assuming further that
the agent’s R&D effort is not observable by the principal. Then this becomes a
dynamic mixed adverse selection and moral hazard problem. Since effort is not
contractible, the first stage mechanism merely specifies the transfer contingent
on the agent’s first stage report. In the second stage, the mechanism specifies
the trading probability and a transfer, both of which rely on the reports of
two stages. The mechanism has to induce both information revelation and
effort provision from the agent. We fully characterize the optimal mechanism
within the class of deterministic mechanisms.7 The optimal deterministic two-
stage mechanism can be implemented by a menu of two single-stage fixed-price
contracts with different remedies paid by the agent for the principal when the
agent defaults (i.e., when the agent fails to deliver the product because of his
high delivery cost). That is, each contract specifies the (fixed) price for the
product if the agent delivers it and the default remedy. The contract with
higher price is associated with higher default remedy. At the equilibrium, the
efficient type chooses the contract with higher price but also higher default
remedy, while the inefficient type selects the contract with lower price but
lower default remedy.
7We establish that the optimal first stage mechanism must be deterministic, and there is
no loss of generality to focus on deterministic second stage mechanism for the efficient type.
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Fixed-price procurement contract is widely adopted in reality.8 A default
clause, which states what will happen if one of the parties fails to live up to
the agreement, is often inserted into a contract. In our procurement scenario,
the agent defaults if he fails (is not willing) to provide the product because
his delivery cost is too high.9 By law, the buyer (the principal) has the right
to claim for a remedy from the seller (the agent) with the amount of (up to)
the difference between the market price (i.e., c0) and the contract price if the
seller (the agent) defaults.10 The prominently used fixed-price contract has
8For example, according to ”Performance of the Defense Acquisition System, 2014
Annual Report”, (firm-) fixed-price contracts constitute about half of all Depart-
ment of Defense (DoD) obligated contracts, including half for each of total products
and services. It is often used when purchasing goods and services from the broader
commercial market. In addition, it is most common in production contracts. For
details, please refer to http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Performance-
of-Defense-Acquisition-System-2014.pdf (accessed September 29, 2015). In
the ”DoD SBIR Desk Reference”, as another example, the (firm-) fixed-price
type contract is almost always used for a Phase I award. Please refer to
http://www.acq.osd.mil/osbp/sbir/sb/resources/deskreference/deskreference.pdf (accessed
September 29, 2015).
9As shall be seen later, since the contract price is strictly lower than c0, the principal
will always make the payment, i.e., she will never default.
10For example, in the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C) 2-712. ”Cover”; Buyer’s Pro-
curement of Substitute Goods., ”The buyer may recover from the seller as damages the
difference between the cost of cover and the contract price together with any incidental
or consequential damages as hereinafter defined (Section 2-715), but less expenses saved in
consequence of the seller’s breach”. Also in U.C.C 2-713. Buyer’s Damages for Non-delivery
or Repudiation., ”Subject to the provisions of this Article with respect to proof of market
price (Section 2-723), the measure of damages for non-delivery or repudiation by the seller
is the difference between the market price at the time when the buyer learned of the breach
and the contract price together with any incidental and consequential damages provided in
this Article (Section 2-715), but less expenses saved in consequence of the seller’s breach”.
In the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), as another example, FAR 52.249-8 Default
(Fixed-Price Supply and Service) states that ”If the Government terminates this contract
in whole or in part, it may acquire, under the terms and in the manner the Contracting
Officer considers appropriate, supplies or services similar to those terminated, and the Con-
tractor will be liable to the Government for any excess costs for those supplies or services.
However, the Contractor shall continue the work not terminated.”. FAR 52.249-9 Default
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several well known advantages: it shifts most or all the risk to the contractor;
it requires a minimum of regulatory and administrative burden; fewer finan-
cial/cost reports are required; it is also easier to design the contract, etc. The
optimality of fixed-price contract in our setting provides another rationale for
the use of fixed-price contract in reality: it is indeed optimal from the pro-
curer’s perspective. Since procurement often involves a natural dynamic flow
of information, unobservable R&D investment, and private R&D efficiency
and delivery cost, it is a little striking that the very simple form of fixed-price
contract with default remedy is the optimum in such a relatively complex en-
vironment, which also implies that fixed-price contract is rather robust in a
general framework.
Several features of the optimal contract are worth noting. First, unlike
the first-best benchmark and the pure adverse selection case, the second stage
trading cutoff rather depends on the first stage type. The sum of the contract
price and the default remedy is no larger than c0 (the principal’s outside op-
tion). Moreover, the contract selected by the efficient type agent has a sum
which is exactly c0, while the one selected by the inefficient type agent has
a sum which is strictly smaller than c0. Notice that the agent delivers the
product if and only if his delivery cost is smaller than the sum of the price and
(Fixed-Price Research and Development) also has such a similar clause.
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the remedy (i.e., the sum is the acquisition cutoff).11 This implies that there
is a downward distortion of the acquisition for the inefficient type since it is
possible that ex post though the agent comes up with a delivery cost smaller
than c0, the principal still turns to the outside option as the agent defaults.
This ex post efficiency loss results from the fact that when moral hazard is fur-
ther brought in, the principal now has to pay an additional moral hazard rent
to the agent: the efficient type is more tempted to mimic the inefficient type
since he can choose the most profitable effort level when he misreports his first
stage type as effort is unobservable. Setting an acquisition cutoff lower than
c0 for the inefficient type would make it less profitable for the efficient type
to deviate from truthful reporting and thus reduces the rent to the efficient
type. A strictly lower acquisition cutoff turns out to be optimal which balances
the rent extraction-efficiency trade-off. Notice that combining with the pure
adverse selection case, this discriminatory allocation does not come from the
pure adverse selection, but rather from the combination of both moral hazard
and adverse selection.
Second, as mentioned before, a higher contract price for the product comes
along with a higher default remedy. Moreover, for the higher price and higher
11To see this, suppose that the agent’s second stage type is c, then if he delivers the
product, his net payoff is the contract price minus c; if he defaults, his net payoff is the
negative of the default remedy. Therefore, the agent will deliver the product if and only if
c is smaller than the sum of the contract price and the remedy.
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default remedy contract, the sum of these two is exactly c0, while the sum of
the price and the remedy in the other contract is strictly lower than c0. Recall
that the buyer (the principal) has the right to claim for a remedy with the
amount of (up to) the difference between the market price and the contract
price when the seller (the agent) fails to deliver the product. The feature that
in the optimal contract the sum of the price and the remedy is smaller than
or equal to the market price echoes this widely observed phenomenon.
Third, the default remedy for the principal is higher for the efficient type.
This result is rather intuitive as with uniform default remedy for different
types, the efficient type definitely has no incentive to mimic the inefficient
type due to the discriminatory contract price. Therefore, the principal is able
to extract more surplus from the efficient type by setting a higher default
remedy. Thus the remedy here plays a dual role: on the one hand, it is a
”penalty” when the agent defaults so that it is a ”stick” to incentivize the
agent to exert effort (the contract price is the ”carrot”); on the other hand, it
is used to extract surplus from the agent.
Fourth, relative to the first-best outcome, there is no effort distortion for
the efficient type, while there is a downward distortion for the inefficient type.
Unlike the pure adverse selection case, the downward distortion is rather due to
the discriminatory acquisition cutoff set for the inefficient type, which dampens
84
the incentive of the inefficient type.
Our paper primarily belongs to the literature on procurement design with
R&D.12 Dasgupta [17] considers a two-period sealed bid procurement model.
Firms having identical marginal R&D cost make investment in period one,
and learn their production costs in period two. The procurer then chooses the
reservation price. He finds that when R&D investment is not observable by
the procurer and the procurer cannot precommit to the second stage reserva-
tion price, the firms underinvest relative to the socially optimal level. When
the procurer can precommit to the second stage reservation price or when in-
vestment is observable such that the procurer can subsidize investment costs,
then firms’ investment is higher and can even reach or go beyond the socially
optimal level. Tan [54] focuses on an environment where the procurer can
precommit to a reservation price in a first or second price auction and bidders’
investment decisions are not observable. Tan [54] accommodates both linear
and nonlinear R&D cost functions. He finds that the first and second price
auctions are equivalent when the R&D cost function is convex. However, this
equivalence no longer prevails when the R&D cost function is linear.13
12In the early literature of procurement design (e.g., Baron and Myerson [7]), suppliers are
assumed to perfectly observe their provision costs. The procurement literature with R&D
is comprehensive. This literature is also closely related to the well established regulation
literature with cost-reducing investment and that on mechanism design with information
acquisition. Here we are unable to provide an exhaustive review due to the space constraint.
13Both Dasgupta [17] and Tan [54] look at the issue of endogenous entry from different
perspectives.
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Piccione and Tan [46] generalize the analytical framework of Dasgupta [17]
and Tan [54] by allowing the selected supplier further reducing the production
cost by exerting a second round costly effort. Suppliers’ investment decisions
are their private information. They find that the full information solution
can be achieved by the first and second price auctions when the R&D tech-
nology exhibits decreasing returns to scale, if the procurer offers the contract
before R&D investment. If the decisions on the procurement mechanism and
the level of investment are simultaneous, then the full information solution is
not implementable. Bag [5] differentiates from these studies by emphasizing
the role of ex ante entry fees, which are first stage transfers. He focuses on
the case where the principal makes the offer before unobservable investment
decisions. One main insight is that the first stage entry fees together with a
second stage efficient auction implement the first-best outcome for the pro-
curer. Arozamena and Cantillon [2] consider a procurement contract of first
or second price sealed bid auction without reservation price. They assume
that investment is observable and only one firm has the opportunity to in-
vest at a time. They find that firms tend to underinvest, and the first price
auction elicits less investment than the second price auction when firms are
heterogeneous.
Our paper complements these existing studies by accommodating private
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R&D efficiency of the supplier and explicitly examining the optimal two-stage
procurement in a framework of dynamic mechanism design with sequential
private information. We find that at the optimum only the inefficient type un-
derinvests regardless of the observability of investment, and the second stage
mechanism must discriminate against the inefficient type if investment is un-
observable.
As procurement naturally involves a dynamic flow of private information
as well as unobservable investment, we adopt the dynamic mechanism design
techniques to conduct a general analysis of the procurement contract. Our
paper contributes to the growing literature on dynamic mechanism design,
which originates from the seminal work of Baron and Besanko [6] in a two-
period regulation environment where a regulated firm’s private costs evolve
over time.14 Courty and Li [14] and Eso˝ and Szentes [18] demonstrate in dif-
ferent environments on sequential screening with pure adverse selection that at
the optimum the second stage mechanism is discriminatory across first stage
types. Pavan, Segal, and Toikka [44] provide a general treatment of optimal
dynamic mechanism design with pure adverse selection.15 While these papers
mainly focus on pure adverse selection, Kra¨hmer and Strausz [26] introduce
14Baron and Besanko [6] allows the agent to exert an effort to reduce the production cost
in the second stage.
15Another strand of literature focuses on the implementation of efficient mechanism, e.g.,
Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki [10], and Athey and Segal [4]. While we focus on cost-minimizing
procurement design, the efficient mechanism can be analyzed analogously.
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moral hazard resulting in endogenous information acquisition to the monopo-
listic price discrimination model of Courty and Li [14].16,17
Our paper also studies a mixed adverse selection and moral hazard prob-
lem in a dynamic environment where the supplier’s R&D efficiency is his first
stage private information. It differentiates from these previous works on dy-
namic mechanism design by fully endogenizing the distribution of the second
stage type by introducing moral hazard,18 and it identifies another source (i.e.,
moral hazard) of discriminatory allocation rule. In our model, since there is
no distortion in the pure adverse selection case, the discriminatory allocation
does not come from the dynamic pure adverse selection, as identified in the
literature. It rather results from the combination of adverse selection and
moral hazard: there is an allocation distortion if and only if both adverse se-
lection and moral hazard are present. This echoes Halac, Kartik, and Liu [22]
that absent either moral hazard or adverse selection there is no efficiency loss,
although in a different setting. As such, our paper extends the insight of con-
16In an independent work, Asseyer [3] also studies a two-stage procurement model with
mixed moral hazard and adverse selection. He focuses on binary investment choice and
the principal’s monitoring policy. Both Kra¨hmer and Strausz [26] and Asseyer [3] focus on
binary effort choice, while the choice of effort is continuous in our setting.
17Other related works on information acquisition include Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki [8],
Ye [56], Cre´mer, Spiegel, and Zheng [16], Lu [31], Moreno and Wooders [40], Shi [51], Lu
and Ye [32], Gentry and Li [20] and Aoyagi [1] among many others. See Bergemann and
Va¨lima¨ki [9] for an excellent survey.
18In Kra¨hmer and Strausz [26], the agent decides whether to incur an information ac-
quisition cost to discover his second stage type. Thus, moral hazard does not affect the
distribution of the second stage type. In this sense, the distribution of second stage type is
exogenous.
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tingent allocation in the sequential screening literature to a new environment
with moral hazard.19
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the
model. We study the optimal mechanism in the benchmark case in section 3.3.
Section 3.4 characterizes the optimal mechanism for the pure adverse selection
setting. In section 3.5, we solve the optimal mechanism for the mixed problem
and discuss the properties of the optimal mechanism. Section 3.6 provides
some concluding remarks. The appendix collects some technical proofs.
3.2 The model setup
A risk neutral buyer (the principal) wants to procure a product from a risk
neutral supplier (the agent). The agent can carry out R&D to improve his
production technology. The agent’s R&D efficiency, θ, is his private informa-
tion. Exerting R&D effort α ≥ 0 costs him C(α, θ), with C(0, θ) = 0, Cα > 0,
Cθ ≥ 0 with equality only when α = 0,20 Cαθ > 0,21 Cαα ≥ 0 and Cααθ ≥ 0.22
Thus, both cost and marginal cost increase when θ increases, which means
that a lower θ is more efficient at conducting R&D. As an example, the cost
19In Kra¨hmer and Strausz [26] there is allocation distortion in the pure adverse selection
case.
20Note that Cθ(0, θ) = 0 since we assume C(0, θ) = 0.
21Our analysis covers the case when Cαθ(0, θ) = 0.
22The assumption that Cααθ ≥ 0 is purely for convenience. Combining with the assump-
tion that Hαα(c, α) < 0 when c ∈ (c, c) (introduced later), it ensures the uniqueness of effort
provision of the inefficient type in the pure adverse selection setting.
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function C(α, θ) = θαr, r ≥ 1, satisfies all these conditions.
We assume that θ can be either θl with probability q or θh with probability
1 − q, where θl < θh and 0 < q < 1. For convenience, the θl (θh) type is also
referred to as the efficient (inefficient) type. The agent’s cost c of delivering the
product when he exerts R&D effort α is a random variable with a cumulative
distribution function H(·, α) defined on support [c, c] with 0 ≤ c < c ≤ ∞.
After the R&D, the delivering cost is privately observed by the agent. The
production cost c is incurred by the agent if and only if the trade happens
between the procurer and the supplier. The principal however can turn to an
outside option of acquiring the good at cost c0 with c < c0 < c. Equivalently,
c0 can be treated as the procurer’s value of the good.
The timing of the game is as follows.
Time 0 : C(·, ·), q, H(·, ·), and c0 are revealed by nature as public informa-
tion. Nature draws θ for the agent. The agent is privately informed about his
type θ.
Time 1 : The principal offers a contract and she commits to it. If the agent
rejects, then the game ends and he obtains the reservation utility which is
normalized as zero. If the agent accepts, then he reports his type θ and the
first stage contract is executed. The agent decides on his R&D effort α if it is
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unobservable,23 and then his delivery cost c is realized according to H(·, α).
Time 2 : The agent decides whether to quit. If he quits, the game is over.
If he continues, then he reports his delivery cost c. The contract is executed.
We use t to denote the gross transfer (aggregated over two stages) from
the principal to the agent. Suppose the agent with type θ exerts effort level α,
and the realized cost is c. If the principal acquires the product from the agent,
then her procurement cost is t, and the agent’s payoff is t−C(α, θ)− c. If the
principal does not acquire the product from the agent, then her procurement
cost is t+ c0, and the agent’s payoff is t− C(α, θ).
The principal’s objective is to minimize the expected procurement cost.
Formally, this is a two-stage game. In the first stage, the agent with type θ
exerts R&D effort α at the cost of C(α, θ). In the second stage, the cost c is
drawn from H(c, α). Both θ and c are the agent’s private information. Thus,
this is a dynamic game with both moral hazard (when α is unobservable) and
adverse selection in the first stage and adverse selection in the second stage.
We assume that the density function h(c, α) (i.e., Hc(c, α)) is continuously
differentiable in (c, α) ∈ [c, c] × [0,+∞), and for any c, H(c, α) is a twice
23If R&D effort is observable, then it is specified by the contract.
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continuously differentiable function with respect to α. In addition,24
Hα(c, α) > 0, Hαα(c, α) < 0, ∀c ∈ (c, c).
Positive Hα(c, α) means that higher effort leads to a better cost distribution in
the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. Negative Hαα(c, α) means that
the marginal effect of α decreases.25 Since H(c, α) ∈ [0, 1], these conditions
mean that when α goes to infinity, the marginal effect Hα(c, α) diminishes to
zero.
Our formulation of H(c, α) covers the following widely adopted form as a
special case:
H(c, α) = 1− (1− F (c))α+β0 ,
where F (·) is a CDF with strictly positive density function everywhere over the
support [c, c] and β0 ≥ 0 is the initial technology endowment of the agent.26
The case β0 = 0 corresponds to the R&D technology used in Tan [54].
3.3 The First-Best: A Benchmark
We first analyze a full information benchmark case where the agent’s action
and the agent’s types are public information. This is the first-best outcome
24Note that since the family of CDFs H(c, α) has common support, H(c, α) = 0, H(c, α) =
1 for any α ≥ 0. Therefore, Hα(c, α) = Hα(c, α) = 0 for any α ≥ 0.
25This assumption validates the ”first-order approach” which replaces the agent’s effort
choice with the first-order condition.
26Thus, if the agent does not invest in R&D, then his delivery cost is randomly drawn
according to CDF H(c, 0).
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that the principal can achieve. In this first-best environment, there is no moral
hazard or adverse selection issues involved.
Suppose for the agent with type θ ∈ {θl, θh} and realized cost c, the contract
specifies the payment to the agent yFB(θ, c) and the acquisition probability
pFB(θ, c). In the first period, the contract prescribes the agent’s effort level
αFB(θ) and the payment to the agent xFB(θ).27 Therefore, the agent’s second
period payoff when his type is θ and the cost realization is c can be expressed
as28
p˜iFB(θ, c) = yFB(θ, c)− pFB(θ, c)c.
The first period expected payoff for the agent with type θ is









(yFB(θ, c) + (1− pFB(θ, c))c0)h(c, αFB(θ))dc
= C(αFB(θ), θ) +
∫ c
c
pFB(θ, c)(c− c0)h(c, αFB(θ))dc+ piFB(θ) + c0, (3.1)
27As we shall see later, the total procurement cost is convex in effort when the second
stage mechanism is efficient (which is optimal given any effort level), so there is no loss
of generality to assume that the required effort αFB(θ) is deterministic. Also note that
the agent’s payoffs are linear in transfers xFB(θ) and yFB(θ, c) so that we can focus on
deterministic transfers.
28For the time being, we ignore the individual rationality constraints. We will verify that
the agent’s payoff is nonnegative for both two stages under the first-best contract.
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which is the sum of social cost and the agent’s first period expected utility.
We summarize the properties of the first-best mechanism. The detailed
derivation is provided in the appendix. In the first-best environment, the
second period mechanism is ex post efficient; both θ types agent has a zero ex-
pected payoff in the first period; and αFB(θh) ≤ αFB(θl), with strict inequality
if and only if αFB(θl) > 0. It is clear that the first-best outcome coincides with
social efficiency.
To rule out the uninteresting case of αFB(θl) = α
FB(θh) = 0, hereafter,
we assume that αFB(θl) > 0, which is satisfied if and only if Cα(0, θl) <∫ c0
c
Hα(c, 0)dc. This means that it is socially efficient to induce the efficient
type agent to exert strictly positive effort. For notational simplicity, we use
αFBl to denote α
FB(θl), similarly for a
FB
h .
In the next section, we shall study how introducing adverse selection (but
with observable R&D effort) distorts the R&D investment but still retains the
ex post efficiency in the second stage. After that, we examine how further
introducing moral hazard issue (unobservable R&D investment) affects the
agent’s R&D incentive and the second stage allocation efficiency.
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3.4 Observable R&D Investment: Pure Ad-
verse Selection
We now turn to the situation in which the agent’s R&D efficiency θ and pro-
vision cost c are his private information, but his R&D investment (i.e., α) is
observable. That is, there is no moral hazard issue. According to the revela-
tion principle (Myerson [42]), there is no loss of generality to restrict to direct
mechanisms, which is truthful on the equilibrium path. The mechanism speci-
fies the first stage payment to the agent x˜(θ) and the effort required α˜(θ) after
receiving the agent’s report θ. The mechanism also specifies the acquisition
probability p˜(θ, c) and the payment to the agent y˜(θ, c) in the second stage,
which depend on both the first stage report θ and the second stage report
c.29,30 To simplify the notations, let α˜h = α˜(θh) and α˜l = α˜(θl). Similar for
the notations x˜h and x˜l.
3.4.1 Stage Two
Assume that the agent truthfully reported his type θ ∈ {θl, θh} in stage one,
and his realized cost is c. Let p˜ip(θ, cˆ, c) be his expected payoff in stage two if
29Since the agent’s first stage and second stage payoffs are linear in payment, there is no
loss of generality to focus on deterministic payment rules x˜(θ) and y˜(θ, c). In addition, since
Cαθ > 0, we can apply the result in Strausz [53] (with some modifications) to show that
there is no loss of generality to focus on deterministic mechanisms. We shall come to this
point later.
30It is clear that allowing the mechanism depending on investment cannot improve the
generality as investment is a function of the first stage report.
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he reports cˆ. Then31







|cˆ=c = −p˜(θ, c).
Thus




It is standard to establish that the second stage incentive compatibility
(IC) is equivalent to that (3.3) holds and that p˜(θ, c) is decreasing in c for any
fixed θ. Note that the agent will still truthfully report his second stage type c
on the off-equilibrium path. That is, if the agent misreported his type in stage
one as θˆ, then he will still truthfully report c in stage two. The reason is that
the true type does not affect the realized value of c ex post. The reported first
stage type solely changes the distribution of cost through the required effort
level. The detailed arguments are as follows. Suppose the reported type is θˆ
in stage one, the realized cost is c, and he reports cˆ instead in stage two. Then
his payoff (3.2) becomes
p˜ip(θˆ, cˆ, c) = y˜(θˆ, cˆ)− p˜(θˆ, cˆ)c.
31We first ignore the second stage individual rationality constraint and then verify that
this is not an issue.
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Note if θˆ is the true type, then cˆ = c maximizes p˜ip(θˆ, cˆ, c) by the optimality of
truthful reporting. However, since p˜ip(θˆ, cˆ, c) does not depend on the true type
θ, the optimality of truthful reporting at the second stage holds regardless
of the report of the first stage. By the same argument, (3.3) holds for any
reported type θˆ.
Note that here we only consider IC in stage two. As will be shown later,
at the optimum the agent’s second stage individual rationality (IR) constraint
is satisfied.
3.4.2 Stage One
We consider both IC and IR in the first stage. Recall that (3.3) holds for any
reported type θˆ. If the efficient type θl agent misreports his type as θh, his
expected payoff is
pihl = x˜h − C(α˜h, θl) +
∫ c
c




Note that there is no loss of generality to assume that p˜ip(θh, c, c) = 0 since we
can always define a new first stage payment x˜′h = x˜h + p˜ip(θh, c, c). Similarly,
we can also assume that p˜ip(θl, c, c) = 0.
97
Then






= x˜h − C(α˜h, θh) +
∫ c
c
p˜(θh, c)H(c, α˜h)dc+ (C(α˜h, θh)− C(α˜h, θl))
= pihh + C(α˜h, θh)− C(α˜h, θl),
where pihh is the first stage expected payoff of the agent with type θh and he
truthfully reports it. Similarly, when the type θh agent misreports his type as
θl, his expected payoff is




= pill − (C(α˜l, θh)− C(α˜l, θl)),
where pill is the first stage expected payoff of the agent with type θl and he
truthfully reports it.
The IC requires that pihl ≤ pill and pilh ≤ pihh. That is,
pill − (C(α˜l, θh)− C(α˜l, θl)) ≤ pihh ≤ pill − (C(α˜h, θh)− C(α˜h, θl)).
3.4.3 The Principal’s Objective
The principal’s objective is to minimize the expected procurement cost which
is the sum of the expected social cost (denoted as SC) and the agent’s first






TCp = SC + qpill + (1− q)pihh
= q{C(α˜l, θl) +
∫ c
c
[p˜(θl, c)c+ (1− p˜(θl, c))c0]h(c, α˜l)dc+ pill}
+ (1− q){C(α˜h, θh) +
∫ c
c
[p˜(θh, c)c+ (1− p˜(θh, c))c0]h(c, α˜h)dc+ pihh}.
The constraints are:
pill − (C(α˜l, θh)− C(α˜l, θl)) ≤ pihh ≤ pill − (C(α˜h, θh)− C(α˜h, θl)); (3.4)
pill ≥ 0, pihh ≥ 0; (3.5)
p˜(θ, c) is decreasing in c, ∀θ. (3.6)
(3.4) and (3.5) are the IC and IR constraints for the first stage, respectively;
(3.6) is the second stage IC constraint.32
Denote the optimal solution to the above problem as {α˜∗l , α˜∗h, p˜∗(θl, c),
p˜∗(θh, c)}. In the appendix, we provide the derivation of the optimal mecha-
nism and establish that α˜∗h ≤ αFBh < αFBl = α˜∗l , and p˜∗(θ, c) = 1 if c ≤ c0, and
p˜∗(θ, c) = 0 if c > c0 for θ ∈ {θl, θh}. That is, the second stage mechanism
is always efficient. We summarize the properties of the optimal pure adverse
selection mechanism in the following proposition.
32Note that we have incorporated the envelope condition (3.3) into the objective function,
thus the second stage IC reduces to (3.6).
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Proposition 3.1. In the pure adverse selection setting with observable R&D
investment, the second stage mechanism is always efficient at the optimum.
The optimal mechanism requires the efficient type (θl) to exert more effort
than the inefficient type (θh). Relative to the first-best outcome, there is no
effort distortion for the efficient type, while there is a downward distortion for
the inefficient type if and only if the first-best effort αFBh > 0.
The downward effort distortion of the inefficient type reflects the usual
rent extraction-efficiency trade-off in the adverse selection model. The ex
post efficiency in the second stage is rather surprising given the optimality
of discriminatory mechanism that is typical in dynamic screening literature
(e.g., Courty and Li [14] and Eso˝ and Szentes [18]). The reason is that in
our setting the observableness of the R&D effort can be utilized to cut off the
linkage between the first stage signal (i.e., the R&D efficiency) and the second
stage signal (i.e., the provision cost). Suppose at the optimum the second
stage mechanism discriminates against the inefficient type θh such that the
corresponding acquisition cutoff c˜∗h is lower than the efficient cutoff c0. By
raising the cutoff c˜∗h to the efficient level while maintaining the same R&D
investment, the surplus generated in the second stage can be shared between
the principal and the agent for the fixed (incentive compatible) second stage
payment rule. Proper adjustments in the first stage payment rule can make
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sure that in the first stage the two types’ expected payoffs remain unchanged
as well as the expected payoffs from deviations. As a result, the first stage
IC still holds and all additional surplus generated goes to the principal. The
observableness of the R&D effort is crucial for the above argument, which
guarantees that the proposed change in acquisition cutoff does not affect the
R&D investment.
In Section 3.5, we will move on to the setting of our main interest, where
the moral hazard issue arises. We shall discuss the efficiency loss and the effort
distortion when R&D effort is unobservable.
3.4.4 Optimal Mechanism
By (3.3) and p˜ip(θ, c, c) = 0 for both θ’s,





0, if c > c0;
c0 − c, if c ≤ c ≤ c0.
Thus by (3.2)
y˜∗(θ, c) = p˜∗(θ, c)c+ p˜ip(θ, c, c) =
{
0, if c > c0;
c0, if c ≤ c ≤ c0. (3.7)
Recall that









and at the optimum, pihh = 0 and pill = C(α˜h, θh)−C(α˜h, θl). Substituting the







and x˜∗l = C(α˜
∗




Note that in our setting, the agent’s second stage ex post payoff must be
nonnegative since the agent bears the production cost only when the principal
acquires the product from him. As a result, the second stage IR is satisfied.
It can be shown that x˜∗l < x˜
∗
h ≤ 0.33 The optimal mechanism can be
implemented by a menu of two single-stage fixed-price contracts with remedy
for the principal if the agent defaults (i.e., the agent fails to deliver the product)
and effort level requirement. Define r˜∗l = −x˜∗l and r∗h = −x˜∗h. Let p˜∗l = c0 − r˜∗l
and p˜∗h = c0 − r˜∗h. p˜∗k > 0 is the price for the product if the agent delivers it;34
while r˜∗k ≥ 0 is the remedy paid by the agent for the principal if the agent
defaults (i.e., the agent fails to deliver the product because his delivery cost is
too high), where k ∈ {l, h}. It is easy to see that the delivery price p˜∗l < p˜∗h,
33Please refer to the appendix for the proof.
34To see that p˜∗k > 0 for k = l, h, note that
p˜∗h > p˜
∗
l = c0 + C(α˜
∗




> c0 + C(α˜
∗
h, θh)− C(α˜∗h, θl) + C(α˜∗l , θl)− (c0 − c)
≥ c+ C(α˜∗l , θl) > 0,
where the second to the last inequality follows from Cθ ≥ 0.
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while the default remedy r˜∗l > r˜
∗
h. Further discussions about the properties of
the optimal contract are provided in Subsection 3.5.9.
The optimal mechanism is summarized as follows.
Proposition 3.2. In the pure adverse selection setting with observable R&D
investment, the optimal mechanism is implemented by a menu of two (single-
stage) fixed-price contracts with default remedy and effort level requirement,
{p˜∗l , r˜∗l , α˜∗l } and {p˜∗h, r˜∗h, α˜∗h} where r˜∗l > r˜∗h ≥ 0, 0 < p˜∗l < p˜∗h ≤ c0 and α˜∗l >
α˜∗h ≥ 0. For k ∈ {l, h}, p˜∗k is the contract price for the agent if he delivers
the product, and r˜∗k is the remedy paid by the agent for the principal if the
agent defaults (i.e., if he fails to deliver the product because his production
cost is too high). The efficient (respectively the inefficient) agent chooses the




3.5 Unobservable R&D Investment: Mixed Prob-
lem
We now turn to a technically more challenging and economically more inter-
esting environment where the agent’s types of two stages and his R&D effort
are all his private information. We thus have a mixed adverse selection and
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moral hazard problem in a dynamic setting.35 As usual, we restrict attention
to the truthful direct mechanisms according to Myerson [42]. In the first stage,
the mechanism is a mapping ρ : {θl, θh} → R×4R+ such that when the agent
reports θ, he receives from the principal a payment x(θ) and a stochastic R&D
effort recommendation α ≥ 0 that has a density ρ(α|θ). The agent decides on
his R&D effort α after reporting θ and his delivery cost c is realized according
to H(·, α). In the second stage, the agent further reports his cost realization
c and then the payment rule y(θ, c) and the acquisition probability p(θ, c) are
executed.36
3.5.1 Stage Two
For the second stage, we ignore the IR for the time being as usual and consider
IC. We will show later that at the optimum the agent’s second stage IR is
satisfied for the proposed optimal mechanism. Assuming truthfully reported
θ ∈ {θl, θh} in stage one, suppose that the agent’s true provision cost is c, but
he reports cˆ. Let p˜i(θ, cˆ, c) be his expected payoff in stage two. Then
p˜i(θ, cˆ, c) = y(θ, cˆ)− p(θ, cˆ)c. (3.8)
35We assume that the total R&D investment cost is also unobservable by the principal,
so no information about R&D effort can be inferred.
36Since the agent has quasi-linear preference, there is no loss of generality to restrict








|cˆ=c = −p(θ, c),
which leads to




It is clear that the second stage IC is equivalent to that (3.9) holds and
that p(θ, c) is decreasing in c for any fixed θ. For the same reason provided
in Subsection 3.4.1, if the agent misreported his type in stage one as θˆ, then
he will still truthfully report c in stage two. Moreover, as in Subsection 3.4.1,
(3.9) holds for any reported type θˆ.
3.5.2 Stage One
We consider both IC and IR in stage one. The IC requires that the agent
will report his type truthfully and follow the principal’s recommendation on
R&D effort supply. This can be decomposed into two requirements: First,
if the agent truthfully reports his type θ, then it is optimal for him to fol-
low the principal’s recommendation. Second, the agent will truthfully report
his type given that he will accordingly choose the optimal effort level condi-
tional on his report and the principal’s recommendation. Note that though
the recommendation can be stochastic, there is no loss of generality to focus
on deterministic recommendation rules. The reason is that when the agent
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reports his type and then receives the recommendation (which depends on the
report), he always chooses a unique optimal effort level regardless of the rec-
ommendation he receives.37 Such effort level only depends on his true type and
the type he reported to the principal. Therefore, we can analyze the IC in two
steps: first we characterize the optimal α(θˆ, θ) if the agent with type θ reports
θˆ (so the recommendation must coincide with α(θˆ, θˆ) if the report is θˆ because
of the first requirement above), then we look at the second requirement.
Step One: the Optimal Response α(θˆ, θ)
If the agent with type θ reports θˆ and exerts effort α, his expected payoff is
pˆi(α, θˆ, θ) = x(θˆ)− C(α, θ) +
∫ c
c
p˜i(θˆ, c, c)h(c, α)dc.
The first term on the right hand side of the above equation is the payment, the
second term is the agent’s investment cost, and the last term is his expected
profit from the second stage. There is no loss of generality to assume that
p˜i(θˆ, c, c) = 0 for both θˆ ∈ {θl, θh}. The reason is that we can always define
x¯(θˆ) = x(θˆ) + p˜i(θˆ, c, c),
and such change does not affect the first stage expected payoff pˆi(α, θˆ, θ) so
that the agent’s reporting and R&D incentive remain the same. Based on
37First, the belief of the agent is not affected by the recommendation. Second, as we shall
show later, the agent’s payoff is concave in effort so that there is no loss of generality to
consider deterministic effort decisions.
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this observation and the fact that (3.9) holds for any reported type θˆ, we can
rewrite the expected payoff as


















Taking derivative with respect to α yields
∂pˆi(α, θˆ, θ)
∂α
= −Cα(α, θ) +
∫ c
c




= −Cαα(α, θ) +
∫ c
c
p(θˆ, c)Hαα(c, α)dc < 0,
when p(θˆ, c) > 0 on a positive measure set. Since the agent’s expected
payoff pˆi(α, θˆ, θ) is strictly concave in α, the optimal α is unique.38 Since
limα→+∞Hα(c, α) = 0 and Cα(α, θ) ≥ Cα(0, θ) > 0, we have that ∂pˆi(α,θˆ,θ)∂α < 0
when α is sufficiently large. If ∂pˆi(α,θˆ,θ)
∂α
= 0 has a (unique) solution α(θˆ, θ) ≥ 0,
then it must be the global optimum. If not, then it must be the case that
∂pˆi(α,θˆ,θ)
∂α
< 0 for all α > 0, which means the agent will choose α = 0. In this
case, we define α(θˆ, θ) = 0. Thus, the agent with type θ who reports θˆ will
choose the optimal effort level α(θˆ, θ) as defined above.
38 ∂
2pˆi(α,θˆ,θ)
∂α2 = 0 only when p(θˆ, c) = 0 for almost all c except on a zero measure set.
However, in this case, from the first order condition we know that the agent will optimally
choose α = 0. Therefore, in all cases the optimal α is unique.
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Step Two: Truthful Report
Define
pi(θˆ, θ) = pˆi(α(θˆ, θ), θˆ, θ) = x(θˆ)− C(α(θˆ, θ), θ) +
∫ c
c
p(θˆ, c)H(c, α(θˆ, θ))dc.
(3.11)
This is the agent’s expected utility when his true type is θ but he reports
θˆ given that he will respond optimally when receiving the recommendation.
Now the first stage IC can be written as
pi(θl, θl) ≥ pi(θh, θl), and pi(θh, θh) ≥ pi(θl, θh), (3.12)
where α(θˆ, θ) ≥ 0 satisfies
−Cα(α(θˆ, θ), θ) +
∫ c
c
p(θˆ, c)Hα(c, α(θˆ, θ))dc ≤ 0, with equality if α(θˆ, θ) > 0.
Recall that the agent’s utility function pˆi(α, θˆ, θ) is strictly concave in α
(> 0) (refer to footnote 38), thus the “first-order approach” is valid. We can
replace the original incentive compatibility constraint for moral hazard with
the above first order condition.
For notational simplicity, let αhl = α(θh, θl) be the optimal effort level that
the agent with type θl and reports θh will choose. αll, αhh, and αlh are defined
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analogically. Now we have
















= pi(θh, θh) + C(αhh, θh)− C(αhl, θl) +
∫ c
c
p(θh, c)[H(c, αhl)−H(c, αhh)]dc.
Thus pi(θl, θl) ≥ pi(θh, θl) is equivalent to
pi(θh, θh) ≤ pi(θl, θl)−C(αhh, θh)+C(αhl, θl)+
∫ c
c
p(θh, c)(H(c, αhh)−H(c, αhl))dc.
(3.13)
Similarly,




= pi(θl, θl)− C(αlh, θh) + C(αll, θl) +
∫ c
c
p(θl, c)[H(c, αlh)−H(c, αll)]dc.
And pi(θh, θh) ≥ pi(θl, θh) is equivalent to
pi(θh, θh) ≥ pi(θl, θl)−C(αlh, θh)+C(αll, θl)+
∫ c
c
p(θl, c)(H(c, αlh)−H(c, αll))dc.
(3.14)




p(θi, c)Hα(c, αij)dc ≤ 0, with equality if αij > 0,∀i, j ∈ {l, h}.
(3.15)
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Note that Cαθ > 0 implies the following result.
Lemma 3.1. We have αll ≥ αlh and αhl ≥ αhh, with equality if and only if
αll = 0 and αhl = 0, respectively.
3.5.3 The Principal’s Objective
The expected social cost can be written as
SC = q{C(αll, θl) +
∫ c
c
[p(θl, c)c+ (1− p(θl, c))c0]h(c, αll)dc}
+ (1− q){C(αhh, θh) +
∫ c
c
[p(θh, c)c+ (1− p(θh, c))c0]h(c, αhh)dc}
= q[C(αll, θl) +
∫ c
c
p(θl, c)(c− c0)h(c, αll)dc]
+(1− q)[C(αhh, θh) +
∫ c
c
p(θh, c)(c− c0)h(c, αhh)dc] + c0.
The principal’s total cost is the sum of the expected social cost and the
agent’s expected profit:
TC = qpi(θl, θl) + (1− q)pi(θh, θh) + SC





pi(θh, θh) ≥ pi(θl, θl)−C(αlh, θh)+C(αll, θl)+
∫ c
c
p(θl, c)(H(c, αlh)−H(c, αll))dc;
(3.16)
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pi(θh, θh) ≤ pi(θl, θl)−C(αhh, θh)+C(αhl, θl)+
∫ c
c
p(θh, c)(H(c, αhh)−H(c, αhl))dc;
(3.17)
constraints (3.15); (3.18)
pi(θ, θ) ≥ 0, ∀θ; (3.19)




p(θ, c) is decreasing in c, ∀θ; (3.21)
0 ≤ p(θ, c) ≤ 1,∀c,∀θ. (3.22)
(3.16) and (3.17) are the first stage IC constraints; (3.18) is the moral hazard
constraints; (3.19) is the first stage IR constraint; (3.20) and (3.21) together are
the equivalent conditions for second stage IC; (3.22) is the constraint imposed
on the acquisition probability. We call this original problem as Problem (O).
Note that (3.20) has been used to simplify the expressions of pi(θi, θj),∀i, j ∈
{h, l} in Problem (O), therefore if it is dropped the optimal solution remains
the same as that in Problem (O). Now we drop constraints (3.16) and (3.20)
to form a relaxed problem Problem (O-R) of Problem (O). If we can show that
the optimal solution in Problem (O-R) satisfies constraint (3.16), then such
solution must be the optimum of Problem (O).
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3.5.4 Problem (O-R)
As is standard, at the optimum of Problem (O-R), (3.17) is binding and
pi(θh, θh) = 0. This is the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2. In Problem (O-R), at the optimum, we must have
pi(θh, θh) = 0 (3.23)
and (3.17) is binding, i.e.,
pi(θl, θl) = C(αhh, θh)− C(αhl, θl) +
∫ c
c
p(θh, c)(H(c, αhl)−H(c, αhh))dc ≥ 0.
(3.24)
Proof: See Appendix. 
(3.24) is the rent that the principal must concede to the efficient type. Note
that when αhl = αhh, the rent reduces to C(αhh, θh)− C(αhh, θl), which takes
the same form with the information rent established in Subsection 3.4.3 for the
case where the R&D effort is observable (i.e., pure adverse selection). However,
recall that αhl ≥ αhh with strict inequality whenever αhl > 0 (Lemma 3.1). In




p(θh, c)H(c, α)dc with respect to α ≥ 0.39 Thus, the rent of the
efficient type is strictly larger than C(αhh, θh)− C(αhh, θl) whenever αhl > 0.
This means that whenever the efficient type exerts positive effort when he
39Note that this is a concave function of α.
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pretends to be the inefficient type, he also enjoys a moral hazard rent in
addition to the information rent due to private R&D efficiency. Therefore, the
principal has to concede to the agent more rent because of the moral hazard
if she still wishes to induce the same level of effort (as in the pure adverse
selection case) from the inefficient type. However, this does not imply that at
the optimum, the efficient type definitely enjoys more rent than that in the
pure adverse selection setting, since the rent for both cases depends on the
effort levels of the inefficient type, which are potentially different.
3.5.5 Problem (O-R-E)
Substituting (3.23) and (3.24) into the objective function in Problem (O-R)
gives
TCE = q[C(αhh, θh)−C(αhl, θl)+
∫ c
c
















p(θ, c) is decreasing in c, ∀θ; (3.26)
0 ≤ p(θ, c) ≤ 1,∀c,∀θ. (3.27)
Note that we have dropped the variables x(θl), x(θh) and y(θ, c) in the
choice variable set. We also drop constraints (3.23) and (3.24), which have
been substituted into the objective function of Problem (O-R). Payments x(θl),
x(θh) and y(θ, c) appear in neither the objective function nor the constraints.
Payments x(θl) and x(θh) are eventually determined by (3.23), (3.24) and the
second stage allocation rule p(θ, c), and y(θ, c) is eventually determined by the
second stage allocation rule.
Now we introduce the notion of cutoff mechanism.
Definition 3.1. (Cutoff Mechanism): A mechanism is called cutoff mech-
anism if the second stage allocation rule satisfy the following conditions: there
exist cl, ch ∈ [c, c] such that
p(θl, c) =
{
1, if c ≤ cl,
0, if c > cl,
and p(θh, c) =
{
1, if c ≤ ch,
0, if c > ch.
For Problem (O-R-E), the following lemma shows that, at the optimum
there is no distortion for the efficient type.
Lemma 3.3. In Problem (O-R-E), at the optimum,
p(θl, c) =
{
1, if c ≤ c0;
0, if c > c0.
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Moreover, there is no effort distortion for θl type, i.e., the induced effort αll =
αFBl .
Proof: See Appendix. 
Obviously, all cutoff mechanisms satisfy (3.26) and (3.27). Lemma 3.3
shows that for the efficient type, the optimal second stage mechanism is a
deterministic one with the optimal cutoff c∗l = c0. In the following analysis, we
restrict our attention to cutoff mechanisms to study the optimal mechanism.40
3.5.6 Problem (O-R-E-E)









Hα(c, αij)dc ≤ 0, with equality if αij > 0, for i = h, and j ∈ {l, h},
(3.28)
40It is an open question whether this restriction introduces loss of generality. It is not
rare in the literature to focus on deterministic mechanisms, such as Kra¨hmer and Strausz
[26]. As pointed out by Laffont and Martimort [28], the commitment issue is more involved
with stochastic mechanisms.
41Note that Lemma 3.3 shows that the optimal c∗l = c0, which further pins down αll, αlh ≥
0 through (3.15). αhl and αhh are determined by ch through (3.28).
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where
TCE′ = (1− q)[c0 + C(αhh, θh) +
∫ ch
c
(c− c0)h(c, αhh)dc]︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected social cost from the inefficient type
+ q[C(αhh, θh)− C(αhl, θl) +
∫ ch
c
(H(c, αhl)−H(c, αhh))dc]︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected rent to the efficient type
+ q[c0 + C(αll, θl) +
∫ c0
c
(c− c0)h(c, αll)dc]︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected social cost from the efficient type
. (3.29)
Intuitively, when ch is higher, the efficient type is more tempted to mimic
the inefficient type. As a result, the rent to the efficient type would in-
crease. The following lemma confirms this intuition. Note that by Lemma
3.2, pi(θl, θl) = C(αhh, θh)−C(αhl, θl) +
∫ ch
c
(H(c, αhl)−H(c, αhh))dc for cutoff
mechanisms.
Lemma 3.4. With cutoff mechanisms, the rent pi(θl, θl) to the efficient type,
i.e., [C(αhh, θh) − C(αhl, θl) +
∫ ch
c
(H(c, αhl) − H(c, αhh))dc], is increasing in
ch. Moreover, it is strictly increasing whenever the induced αhl > 0.
Proof: See Appendix. 
Regarding the optimal c∗h, we have the following result.
Lemma 3.5. In Problem (O-R-E-E), the optimal cutoff c∗h < c0.
Proof: See Appendix. 
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The intuition of Lemma 3.5 is as follows. If the moral hazard does not cause
additional agency cost to the principal, then it implies that 1) the second stage
mechanism must be ex post efficient; 2) the efficient type does not enjoy moral
hazard rent. However, when the second stage is efficient, i.e., ch = c0, the
efficient type exerts the same level of effort as that in the first-best situation
when he pretends to be the inefficient type. That is, αhl = α
FB
l . In addition,
the second requirement is fulfilled only when αhl = αhh, which holds only
when αhl = 0. Thus, unless it is socially inefficient to induce the efficient type
to exert strictly positive effort, the principal always needs to concede moral
hazard rent to the efficient type agent. As a result, moral hazard always causes
additional agency cost to the principal.
As shown in Lemma 3.3, there is no distortion for the efficient type. The
result is quite intuitive. Fix the other choice variables in Problem (O-R-E),
then minimizing the objective function by jointly choosing αll and p(θl, c)
is equivalent to maximizing total surplus. Clearly, this leads to a cutoff of
c∗l = c0, which corresponds to an ex post efficient second stage mechanism for
the efficient type. Given the second stage mechanism is efficient, it is incentive
compatible for the efficient type to choose the efficient R&D effort since the
second stage VCG mechanism perfectly aligns the incentive of the agent with
the social surplus.
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For the inefficient type, the principal faces the efficiency-rent extraction
trade-off. By Lemma 3.4, the second under-bracketed expression of (3.29)–the
rent to the efficient type is increasing in the cutoff ch in [c, c]. Note that αhh
and αhl are determined by ch. It is clear that the expected social cost from the
inefficient type–the first under-bracketed expression in (3.29) is decreasing in ch
in [c, c0] and increasing in [c0, c]. Note that minimizing this term is equivalent
to maximizing the total surplus from the inefficient type. Setting an ex post
efficient cutoff c0 would induce an efficient R&D effort, thus the concerned
term is minimized. When ch increases from c to c0, the R&D effort increases
to the efficient level and the second stage allocation gets more efficient, which
means the total surplus keeps improving. When ch increases from c0 to c, the
R&D effort continues diverging from the efficient level and the second stage
allocation gets less efficient, which means the total surplus is deteriorating.
Therefore, to minimize the total expected cost TCE′ , ch cannot be strictly
larger than c0.
The optimal cutoff c∗h is obtained by equating the gain in social surplus
from the inefficient type (the absolute value of the first order derivative of the
first under-bracketed expression) to the increase in rent to the efficient type
118
(the first order derivative of the second under-bracketed expression)42,43:
−(1− q)(ch − c0)[h(ch, αhh(ch)) + α′hh(ch)Hα(ch, αhh(ch))]
= q[H(ch, αhl(ch))−H(ch, αhh(ch))]. (3.30)
Note that when ch = c0, the marginal surplus gain from the procurement
is zero while the marginal rent is strictly positive.44 As a result, it is never
optimal to set the cutoff greater than or equal to c0. When ch is set below
c0, such discrimination against the inefficient type will make it less profitable
for the efficient type to mimic the inefficient type. Therefore, the rent to the
efficient type is reduced. The lower the cutoff is, the less the rent will be.
On the other hand, lower cutoff incurs more social cost. The principal has to
42In this footnote, we derive the first order derivative of the first under-bracketed ex-
pression in (3.29). Take derivative with respect to ch and bear in mind that αhh is de-
termined by ch through (3.28) (denote it as αhh(ch)). There exists a cutoff cˇ ∈ [c, c],
such that αhh(ch) = 0 when ch ≤ cˇ and αhh(ch) > 0 when ch > cˇ. (It is possible
that such cˇ does not exist, which means that αhh(ch) = 0 for all ch ∈ [c, c].) Thus,




Hα(c, αhh)dc) = 0 for all ch ∈ [c, c]. It is easy to see that
α′hh(ch) > 0 when ch > cˇ. Now take derivative with respect to ch for the concerned first
expression in (3.29) (neglecting the factor (1− q)), we obtain








+ (ch − c0)(h(ch, αhh(ch)) + α′hh(ch)Hα(ch, αhh(ch)))
= (ch − c0)(h(ch, αhh(ch)) + α′hh(ch)Hα(ch, αhh(ch))).
43By the proof of Lemma 3.4, the first order derivative of the second under-bracketed
expression in (3.29) is q[H(ch, αhl(ch))−H(ch, αhh(ch))].
44When ch = c0, the induced αhl = α
FB
l > 0. Also note that αhl > αhh whenever αhl > 0
(Lemma 3.1).
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find the optimal way to balance between these two conflicting effects, which is
determined by (3.30).
3.5.7 Going back to Problem (O)
Let the optimal solution to Problem (O-R-E-E) be {α∗ll, α∗hl, α∗hh, α∗lh, c∗l , c∗h}
in which c∗l = c0 and c
∗
h < c0. Note that Problem (O-R-E-E) is equivalent
to Problem (O-R-E) with deterministic second stage allocation rules for the
inefficient type. Also note that Problem (O-R-E) is equivalent to Problem
(O-R), which is a relaxed problem of the original problem Problem (O) in the
sense that (3.16) is dropped. Thus, if we can show that the optimal solution
of Problem (O-R-E-E) satisfies (3.16), then such solution must be the optimal
solution to Problem (O), if we restrict to deterministic second stage allocation
rules for the inefficient type. In fact, the following lemma shows that (3.16) is
indeed satisfied.45
Lemma 3.6. The optimal solution of Problem (O-R-E-E) is feasible in Prob-
lem (O). Therefore, it is the optimal solution to Problem (O) within the class of
mechanism with deterministic second stage allocation rules for the inefficient
type.
45In the proof of Lemma 3.6 we show that ch ≤ cl is sufficient for first stage IC for cutoff
mechanisms. In fact, this weak monotonicity in cutoff is also necessary for first stage IC.
This result can be extended to the continuous first stage type setting. More details will be
provided in the conclusion section.
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Proof: See Appendix. 
Combining with Lemmas 3.5 and 3.6, we have the following characteriza-
tion of the second stage allocation rule.46
Corollary 3.1. Given αFBl > 0 (i.e., it is socially efficient to induce the
efficient type to exert a strictly positive R&D effort), we have c∗h < c0, i.e., the
optimal acquisition cutoff c∗h for the inefficient type is smaller than that (i.e.,
c0) of the efficient type.
This means that moral hazard renders the second stage inefficient for the
inefficient type and that there is an additional agency cost comparing to the
observable effort scenario.
3.5.8 Optimal Mechanism and Implementation
We first describe the second stage optimal allocation rule and payments. By
Lemmas 3.3, 3.5 and 3.6, the second stage optimal allocation rule is described
as in the following proposition. Moreover, by (3.8) and (3.20), we also have
the following characterizations of the second stage optimal payment rule.
Proposition 3.3. At the optimum, (i) the second stage allocation rule is:
p∗(θl, c) =
{
1, if c ≤ c0,
0, if c > c0,
and p∗(θh, c) =
{
1, if c ≤ c∗h,
0, if c > c∗h,
where c∗h is the
optimal solution of Problem (O-R-E-E); and (ii) the second stage payment





c0, if c ≤ c0,
0, if c > c0,
and y∗(θh, c) =
{
c∗h, if c ≤ c∗h,
0, if c > c∗h.
Note that the agent’s second stage ex post payoff must be nonnegative since
the agent bears the production cost only when the principal buys the product
from him. As a result, we confirm that the second stage IR is satisfied.
The first stage payment rule is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.4. At the optimum, both types pay to the principal in the first
stage and the efficient type pays more. That is, x∗(θl) < x∗(θh) ≤ 0. Specifi-
cally,












Proof: See Appendix. 
Implementation by Fixed-Price Contract
The optimal two-stage mechanism can be implemented by a menu of two
single-stage fixed-price contracts with different remedies for the principal when
the agent defaults (i.e., when the agent fails to deliver the product). Define








h ≥ 0 by Proposition 3.4 and it can be shown




r∗k ≥ 0 is the remedy paid by the agent for the principal if the agent defaults
(i.e., if he fails to deliver the product because his delivery cost is too high),
and p∗k ∈ (0, c0) is the contract price for the product if the agent delivers it,
k ∈ {l, h}. The agent is offered a menu of two fixed-price contracts with default
remedy, {p∗l , r∗l } and {p∗h, r∗h}. If the agent selects contract {p∗k, r∗k}, then the
price for his product if he delivers it is p∗k, but he must compensate the buyer
by r∗k if he defaults. Thus if the agent wishes to have a higher selling price for
the product, the potential default remedy is also higher. In equilibrium, the
efficient type agent selects the contract with higher price but higher default
remedy, while the inefficient type agent chooses the contract with lower price
but lower default remedy.
3.5.9 Discussions
Ex Post Efficiency
Now we go on to discuss the effects of introducing moral hazard (i.e., unob-
servable R&D effort). Since the second stage acquisition cutoff for the efficient
type is set at c0, there is no efficiency loss in the second stage for the efficient
type, i.e., the second stage mechanism is ex post efficient for the efficient type.
47Please refer to the appendix for the proof.
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However, the second stage mechanism discriminates against the inefficient type
by setting an acquisition cutoff c∗h strictly lower than c0. This leads to a second
stage efficiency loss for the inefficient type.
Recall that in the pure adverse selection case the acquisition cutoffs for both
types are pooling at c0, which means that the optimal pure adverse selection
mechanism is ex post efficient in terms of the allocation. Another benchmark
is pure moral hazard in the first stage and pure adverse selection in the second
stage. That is, the agent’s R&D ability θ is public, while his effort level and
the second stage type are his private information, which is a standard ”moral
hazard followed by adverse selection”. Since the agent is risk neutral, the prin-
cipal can achieve the first-best by making the agent the residual claimant for
the profit. Thus, there is ex post efficiency loss (or discriminatory allocation)
if and only if both moral hazard and adverse selection are present in the first
stage. One insight from the dynamic screening literature (e.g., Courty and Li
[14] and Eso˝ and Szentes [18]) is that the pure adverse selection could lead
to discriminatory allocation in the second stage. In our setting, the distor-
tion does not come from pure dynamic adverse selection, but rather from the
combination of moral hazard and adverse selection. Thus, we identify another
source of discriminatory allocation which extends the insight in the dynamic
screening literature to a new environment.
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Since the second stage acquisition cutoff for the efficient type is set at
the efficient level, there is no effort distortion for the efficient type relative
to the first-best level. Since the inefficient type’s effort α∗hh is determined by
(3.28) and c∗h < c0, we have α
∗
hh ≤ αFBh by comparing (3.28) with (C.2). The
inequality is strict whenever αFBh > 0. This means that in general there is a
downward effort distortion for the inefficient type.
Recall that in the pure adverse selection (observable R&D effort) setting,
the R&D effort level for the efficient type also equals the first-best level. Hence,
introducing moral hazard in addition to adverse selection does not affect the
effort induced for the efficient type. On the other hand, introducing moral
hazard requires a lower acquisition cutoff for the inefficient type in order to
reduce the information rent to the efficient type. This leads to a downward
distortion of this type’s R&D effort relative to the first-best. Although the
acquisition cutoff is set at the efficient level for the inefficient type when the
R&D effort is observable, the R&D effort level of the inefficient type is also
set at a level lower than the first-best in order to lower the information rent
to the efficient type.
When R&D effort is not observable, the principal has to rely on the second
stage acquisition cutoff to incentivize the agent to invest and screen different
types at the same time. Although a lower acquisition cutoff for the inefficient
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type damages the inefficient type’s investment incentive, it reduces the infor-
mation rent to the efficient type. When there is only adverse selection, the
principal can rather directly rely on specifying the R&D effort levels to screen
different types without sacrificing the second stage allocation efficiency. With
observable R&D effort, the second stage acquisition cutoff is fixed at the ef-
ficient level–the principal does not discriminate different types of agent. The
payment scheme in the first stage is sufficient to induce the agent to invest at
the specified levels because the investment levels are observable.
The Fixed-Price Contracts
By Proposition 3.2, the pure adverse selection mechanism can be implemented
by a menu of two (single-stage) fixed-price contracts with default remedy and
effort level requirement, {p˜∗l , r˜∗l , α˜∗l } and {p˜∗h, r˜∗h, α˜∗h}. The contracts have the
feature that the sum of the contract price and the default remedy is exactly c0.
It is a little counter-intuitive that the efficient type agent selects the contract







ever, the reason is that the effort is regulated by the principal: If he chooses
the other contract, then he is required to exert a lower level of effort (since
α˜∗h < α˜
∗
l ), which leads to a higher probability of default and a lower probability
of delivery. Therefore, although the delivery price is higher and the remedy is
lower in the other contract, since the effort is controlled by the principal, the
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efficient type agent will not deviate.
The optimal mixed-problem mechanism can also be implemented by a menu
of two (single-stage) fixed-price contracts with default remedy, {p∗l , r∗l } and
{p∗h, r∗h}. Several features of the optimal fixed-price contract in this case are
worth noting. First, unlike the contract in the pure adverse selection case,
the magnitudes direction of the contract price and default remedy are now
different. For the efficient type agent, the contract price offered is p∗l , which
is larger than that in the other contract; while the remedy for the principal
when he defaults is also higher than that in the other contract. Therefore, if
the agent wishes to have a higher selling price for his product, he also bears
the risk of paying a higher remedy if his production cost is so high that he
prefers non-delivery.
Another key feature is that the sum of the price and the remedy for the
efficient type is exactly c0, while it is strictly lower than c0 for the inefficient
type (it equals c∗h). This results from the discriminatory acquisition cutoff
against the inefficient type and leads to ex post efficiency loss. To see this,
note that in the contract {p∗k, r∗k}, the agent is willing to deliver the product
when and only when his delivery cost is smaller than p∗k + r
∗
k, where k ∈ {l, h}
(so the sum is the acquisition cutoff).48 Therefore, if the sum c∗h is smaller
48Suppose the agent’s second stage type is c (his delivery cost), then if he delivers the
product, his net payoff is p∗k− c; if he defaults, his net payoff is −r∗k. Therefore, he is willing
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than c0, which is the case in the optimal mechanism, the agent prefers default
when his cost c ∈ (c∗h, c0) so that the principal has to turn to the outside option
which costs her c0. Therefore, there is efficiency loss ex post. As discussed
before, this results from that the principal has to sacrifice the efficiency to
decrease the rent for the efficient type and that a strictly lower acquisition
cutoff optimally balances this rent extraction–efficiency trade-off when moral
hazard arises.
Third, the default remedy plays a dual role in the optimal contract. On
the one hand, the remedy (as the ”stick”) and the contract price (as the
”carrot”) work together to incentivize the agent to exert effort when moral
hazard arises. On the other hand, the remedy paid by the agent if he defaults
also serves to extract surplus. Notice that the default remedy for the principal
is higher for the efficient type. This is rather intuitive as with uniform default
remedy for different types, the efficient type definitely has no incentive to
mimic the inefficient type due to the discriminatory contract price. Therefore,
the principal is able to extract more surplus from the efficient type by setting
a higher default remedy.
Fourth, a comparison of the magnitude directions of the contract price and
default remedy between the pure adverse selection case and the mixed-problem




also helps to understand the role of moral hazard. As mentioned above, when
effort is observable, the contract for the efficient type has a lower contract
price but a higher default remedy. In other words, the magnitudes of the
contract price and the remedy go in the opposite direction. However, in the
mixed-problem, a higher contract price is associated with a higher remedy,
which means the two go in the same direction. The reason for the opposite
direction, as mentioned above, is precisely because effort is regulated by the
principal so that if the agent deviates he cannot freely choose the effort level.
In the mixed-problem, it is never possible that the contract price and the
remedy go in the opposite direction. This is very intuitive because the agent
can freely choose his effort choice so that he will definitely opt for the contract
with a higher contract price but a lower remedy if these two can go in the
opposite direction. In the pure adverse selection contract, the efficient type
chooses the contract with a lower price and a higher remedy. However, in
the mixed-problem contract, in order to have the right to claim for a higher
remedy, the principal has to offer a higher selling price for the efficient type
agent. The latter one is more ”lenient” to the efficient type agent. Intuitively,
the principal has to concede more rent to the efficient type when she cannot
observe the agent’s effort so that she cannot offer a lower price and claim for
a higher remedy at the same time.
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Finally, the magnitudes of the contract price and the remedy in the mixed-
problem are also worth mentioning. Notice that the contract price p∗k is always
smaller than c0, k ∈ {l, h}. Therefore, the principal will never default since the
contract price is always lower than the market price c0.
49 By law, the buyer
(the principal) has the right to claim for a remedy from the seller (the agent)
with the amount of (up to) the difference between the market price (i.e., c0)
and the contract price if the seller (the agent) defaults.50 In the mixed-problem
contract, the sum of the price and the remedy for the efficient type is exactly
c0, while it is strictly lower than c0 for the inefficient type. In other words,
for the efficient type the remedy is exactly the difference between the market
price c0 and the contract price p
∗
l ; while for the inefficient type, the remedy is
”partial” in the sense that it is strictly smaller than the difference.51 Thus, the
fixed-price contract with default remedy in our setting reflects the regulations
in reality.
Fixed-price procurement contract is widely adopted in reality. A default
clause, which states what will happen if one of the parties fails to fulfill the
agreement, is often inserted into a contract. As mentioned in the Introduc-
tion, the optimality of fixed-price contract in our setting provides another
49This observation also applies to the pure adverse selection contract.
50Please refer to footnote 10 for several examples.
51In the pure adverse selection contract, since the sum of the contract price and the
remedy is always c0, it means that the remedy for the principal is exactly the difference
between the market price and the contract price.
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rationale for the use of fixed-price contract in reality in addition to several
well known advantages: it is indeed optimal from the procurer’s perspective.
The implementation by a menu of fixed-price contracts with remedy in a typ-
ical procurement environment with a dynamic flow of private information and
unobservable investment implies that the fixed-price contract is rather robust
in a general framework.
3.6 Concluding Remarks
This paper studies the optimal procurement design in a two-stage setting where
the R&D efficiency of the supplier is his private information, and the supplier
can make R&D effort to improve his chance of discovering a more cost-efficient
way of providing the good. We analyze this design problem from a dynamic
mechanism design perspective. The first stage mechanism specifies the contin-
gent effort level and transfer when agent’s R&D effort is observable; otherwise,
it can only specify the transfer rule. In the second stage (after the R&D effort
is incurred by the agent in the first stage), the good provision and payment
rules are carried out, which are contingent on reports of both two stages. To
our best knowledge, this is the first time in the procurement design literature
that the contractor’s private R&D ability and endogenized R&D effort (ob-
servable or unobservable) are jointly integrated into an analytical framework
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of dynamic mechanism design.
We find that observable effort cuts off the impact of the agent’s first stage
private information on the second stage allocation rule. Regardless of the
R&D efficiency, the second stage allocation rule is always ex post efficient.
The principal solely relies on the first stage mechanism (effort provision and
transfer rules) to elicit the agent’s private information on R&D efficiency.
To reduce information rent to the efficient type, the inefficient type’s effort
provision is distorted downward relative to the first-best level.
When the agent’s R&D effort is unobservable, the principal must also rely
on discriminatory second stage allocation rule to optimally elicit first stage
private information and induce the desired R&D effort level. At the optimum,
the second stage allocation rule discriminates against the inefficient type by
setting a lower acquisition threshold in provision cost. The second stage al-
location rule for the efficient type remains ex post efficient regardless of the
observability of R&D effort. Such favoritism incentivizes the efficient type
to exert efficient effort and dampens the effort of the inefficient type. While
the inefficient type’s R&D effort is distorted downward, together with the dis-
criminatory second stage allocation rule, it reduces the information rent to the
efficient type, and thus strikes the optimal efficiency-information rent trade-
off. Note that the second stage allocation rule is discriminatory if and only
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if both moral hazard and adverse selection are present in the first stage. In
other words, the distortion does not solely come from the adverse selection.
The optimal two-stage mechanism can be implemented by a menu of two
(single-stage) fixed-price contracts with remedy paid by the agent for the prin-
cipal when the agent defaults. A higher contract price is associated with a
higher default remedy. The optimality of fixed-price contract provides an-
other rationale for the widely adopted fixed-price procurement contracts in
reality. The remedy in the contract plays a dual role: it serves as a ”stick” to
motivate the agent to exert effort and at the same time it extracts the agent’s
surplus.
Our analysis illustrates the subtle impacts of the agent’s private informa-
tion of R&D efficiency on optimal procurement designs for both observable
and unobservable R&D effort. Moreover, we find that the optimal mecha-
nism crucially depends on the observability of R&D effort. These observations
provide useful guidelines for the designer to appropriately take these factors
into account when considering the optimal procurement design that targets on
acquisition cost effectiveness.
The insights obtained in our paper extend to other environments. Suppose
the principal can observe the agent’s total R&D cost though his R&D effort
is not directly observed. The principal’s problem with observable total R&D
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cost is equivalent to that with observable R&D effort.52 When total R&D cost
is contractible, once the agent reports his type, the principal can impose an
R&D cost that equals the total effort cost induced by the optimal mechanism
with observable R&D effort. Clearly, the resulting mechanism duplicates the
optimal mechanism with observable R&D effort.
While our analysis is carried out assuming that the first stage types are
discrete, our main results are still valid when the first stage types are contin-
uous. When R&D effort is observable, the principal’s problem can be fully
solved in a similar way, with the non-discrimination result (ex post efficiency)
holding in the second stage. When R&D effort is not observable, we find that
for deterministic second stage mechanisms, the first stage IC is equivalent to
decreasing second stage acquisition thresholds in the first stage types together
with a usual envelope condition.53 This equivalence characterization implies
that in general the discrimination against the inefficient type in the second
stage is robust in the continuous type setting.
We have focused on an environment with single agent. While we expect
that the main insights can be extended to a multi-agent setting, new issues of
information disclosure and belief-updating would arise and create additional
52In our paper, the R&D cost is completely determined by the agent’s type and effort
level. If an additional noise kicks in, then we have a mixed problem (cf. Laffont and Tirole
[29]).
53Kra¨hmer and Strausz [26] also provide an equivalence result for deterministic mecha-
nisms in a different setting.
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challenges in the analysis. We leave these interesting issues to future works.
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Appendix A
Proofs of Chapter One
Proof of Lemma 1.2: From (1.17), λ(t) should not depend on any t−i, ∀i.
Thus, λ(t) must be a constant and does not depend on t. Since λ(t) = λ is
a constant, and since µi(ti) ≥ 0, from (1.17) we must have J(ti) − t0 ≤ λ for
every ti. This means that λ ≥ b−t0 > 0, as J(ti) ≤ b. Note [J(ti)− t0] < b−t0
for all ti < b. Then µi(ti) = λ− [J(ti)− t0] > 0 for all ti < b, ∀i. Thus, (1.15)
must be binding for all ti < b at the optimal solution. This implies that
Vi(ti) = 0, ∀ti < b,∀i.
Since λ > 0, (1.14) must be binding for every t, which implies that∫
t
∑





Vi(ti)f(ti)dti = V . This means
that at least one Vi(b) should be infinity. However, Vi(b) = ∞ is impossible.
Thus an optimal solution does not exist for the relaxed problem (P-Relax). 
Proof of Lemma 1.3: We will establish that bV is an upper bound of the
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vi(t)]f(t)dt + t0V ≤ (b− t0)
∫
t
V f(t)dt + t0V
= bV.
This upper bound bV cannot be reached by any mechanism as Lemma 1.2
showed that an optimal solution does not exist for problem (P-Relax). 
Proof of Lemma 1.4: One can verify that
Vi(ti;K) =
{
0, if ti≤ t∗(K);
(V +NK)FN−1(ti)−K > 0, if ti> t∗(K).
and it is increasing in ti.
Note that the construction of the effort functions corresponds to (1.9) with
ui(a, a) = 0. We have tiVi(ti;K)−
∫ ti
a
Vi(s;K)ds > 0 for ti > t
∗(K), as Vi(s;K)
is strictly increasing given ti > t
∗(K) and a > 0. Therefore, e∗i (t;K) ≥ 0
for every t. Finally, it is obvious that the prize allocation function v∗i (t;K)
satisfies the budget constraint. Thus, all constraints in the original problem
(P) are satisfied and therefore, (v(·;K), e(·;K)) is feasible for every K ≥ 0.
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Since problem (P-Relax) is a relaxed problem of problem (P), (v(·;K), e(·;K))
is also feasible in problem (P-Relax) for every K ≥ 0.

















[J(ti)− t0] [NFN−1(ti)− 1]dF (ti) + t0V.
When K → +∞, t∗(K) goes to b. Therefore, the first part in the last expres-
sion goes to zero. The third part is a constant. To show that the expected
total effort converges to bV when K → +∞, it suffices to show that the second
part converges to (b − t0)V when K → +∞. For the second part, note that















































N(b− t0)(N − 1)
NVK2
(V +NK)2(N − 1)
= (b− t0)V.
Hence, the expected total effort R(K) converges to bV .
We now turn to the contestants’ expected payoffs. Recall that the con-
testants’ expected total payoffs are at most the difference between V and the
expected total effort costs.1 Since expected total effort converges to bV , we
must have the total effort costs converge to bV/b = V since only those types
within a small neighborhood of b would exert positive effort. It follows that
the contestants’ expected total payoffs must converge to zero.
As K → +∞, almost all types except b obtain zero expected prize and
exert zero effort. What remains interesting is how much informational rent
1When the budget constraint is binding, the contestants’ expected total payoffs are equal
to the difference between V and the expected total effort costs.
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the type b can enjoy at the limit.
Note that FN−1(t∗(K)) ≤ FN−1(s) ≤ 1, ∀s ∈ [t∗(K), b]. Thus, (N−1)K ≤
(V +NK)FN−1(s)−K ≤ (N − 1)K + V . Therefore,
lim
K→+∞















[b− t∗(K)](N − 1)K = lim
K→+∞










N(N − 1)V K2





Proof of Lemma 1.5: We claim v~i (ti, t−i) = −K for ti > tˆ~i if there exists
some contestant j 6= i such that tj > ti. Suppose not, then v~i (ti, t−i) > −K,
which means ξi(t) = 0. In addition, we have µi(ti) = 0 from the fact V
~
i (ti) >
0. Thus [J(ti)− t0]− λ = 0. Note [J(tj)− t0]− λ+ µj(tj) + ξj(ti, tj, t−ij) = 0.
Thus J(tj)−t0 = λ−µj(tj)−ξj(ti, tj, t−ij) ≤ λ = [J(ti)− t0], which contradicts
the assumption that J(·) is a strictly increasing function.
When ti is the highest among all contestants, contestant i can at most
collect V + (N − 1)K; when ti > tˆ~i is not the highest, v~i (ti, t−i) = −K. For
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contestant i, when ti > tˆ
~
i , we must have
0 < V ~i (ti) ≤ [V + (N − 1)K]FN−1(ti)−K · (1− FN−1(ti))
= (V +NK)FN−1(ti)−K. (A.1)
(A.1) implies that tˆ~i ≥ t˜0 = F−1(( KV+NK )
1
N−1 ). 
Proof of Lemma 1.6: It is straight-forward to verify that V¯i(ti) satisfies all
the conditions in the maximization problem (P-K-Relax-Equivalent-Relax).
To simplify notations, we hereafter use tˆ and t∗ to denote tˆ(K) and t∗(K),
respectively. Define tM = J−1(t0). We next consider two cases to show the
optimality of V¯i(ti). Case 1: t
∗ = tˆ, i.e., J(tˆ) ≥ t0. Case 2: t∗ = tM , i.e.,
J(tˆ) ≤ t0.
First, we consider Case 1 where J(tˆ) ≥ t0, i.e., t∗ = tˆ ≥ tM . We shall



























[J(ti)− t0] (V¯ i(ti)− V i(ti))f(ti)dti.
(A.3)
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Note that Vi(ti) ≥ 0. In addition, when ti > t∗ = tˆ, V¯i(ti) = (V +
NK)FN−1(ti)−K. So V¯i(ti)− Vi(ti) ≥ 0 for ti > t∗ = tˆ.























[J(ti)− t0] (V¯ i(ti)− V i(ti))f(ti)dti.










(V¯ i(ti)− V i(ti))f(ti)dti,











According to constraint (1.36), the LHS of (A.4) must be bounded by V .









= (V +NK)FN(ti)|bti=t∗−NK(1− F (t
∗))
= (V +NK)(1− FN(t∗))−NK +NKF (t∗)
= V − (V +NK)FN−1(t∗)F (t∗) +NKF (t∗)
= V − (V +NK)· NK
V +NK
·F (t∗) +NKF (t∗) =V.
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Hence (A.4) holds.
Second, we consider Case 2: J(tˆ) ≤ t0, i.e., tˆ ≤ t∗ = tM . We shall show






















Consider contestant i. Suppose that tˆi ≥ tM . Note that when ti > tM , we










Now suppose that tˆi < t



















The last inequality holds because when ti > t
M , Vi(ti) ≤ (V +NK)FN−1(ti)−
K = V¯i(ti) and [J(ti)− t0] > 0.
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This completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 1.2: It is easy to verify that the prize allocation func-
tion generates
V ∗i (ti) =
{
0, if ti ≤ t∗(K);
(V +NK)FN−1(ti)−K > 0, if ti > t∗(K). (A.5)
which is the optimal V¯i(ti) of Lemma 1.6. Note that V
∗
i (ti) is discontinuous at
ti = t
∗(K).
As we noted earlier, the supporting effort functions {e∗i (t), i = 1, 2, ..., N}
can be constructed using (1.9) with ui(a, a) = 0, which gives us e
∗
i (t) =
ε(ti;K). One can verify that ε(ti;K) is strictly positive and increasing in
ti for ti > t
∗(K). Note also that because V ∗i (ti) is discontinuous at ti = t
∗(K),
ε(ti;K) is also discontinuous at ti = t
∗(K).
We can easily verify that all constraints in problem (P-K) are satisfied in
mechanism (v∗(·;K), e∗(·;K)). We thus have established that (v∗(·;K), e∗(·;K))
is indeed an optimal solution for problem (P-K). 
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Appendix B
Proofs of Chapter Two
Proof of Lemma 2.1: If there exists some t > t0 such that e1, e2 ∈ S(t),
then since e1 < e2, and since e1 and e2 lead to the same expected payoff for
the entrant with type t, V˜ (e1) < V˜ (e2). Now assume that e1 ∈ S(t1) and
e2 ∈ S(t2) with e1, e2 /∈ S(t1)∩S(t2), where t1, t2 > t0. Incentive compatibility
requires that for type t2 contestant exerting effort e2 is weakly better than
exerting effort e1. That is, V˜ (e2) − e2t2 ≥ V˜ (e1) − e1t2 . If V˜ (e1) > V˜ (e2), then
exerting effort e1 is strictly better. A contradiction. 
Proof of Lemma 2.2: Suppose to the contrary that there exists e1 ∈ S(t1)
and e2 ∈ S(t2) such that e1 > e2. By lemma 2.1, V˜ (e1) ≥ V˜ (e2). Incentive
compatibility requires that for type t1 exerting effort e1 is weakly better than
exerting effort e2. That is, V˜ (e1) − e1t1 ≥ V˜ (e2) − e2t1 , which implies that
V˜ (e1) − V˜ (e2) ≥ e1−e2t1 . Similarly, incentive compatibility requires that for
type t2 exerting effort e2 is weakly better than exerting effort e1. That is,
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V˜ (e2)− e2t2 ≥ V˜ (e1)− e1t2 , which implies that V˜ (e1)− V˜ (e2) ≤ e1−e2t2 . However,
since V˜ (e1) − V˜ (e2) ≥ e1−e2t1 and since t1 < t2, V˜ (e1) − V˜ (e2) ≤ e1−e2t2 is
impossible. 
Proof of Lemma 2.3: First notice that if for any scenario which happens with
positive probability, all the prizes in that scenario are equal, then obviously
S(t) only contains zero since there is no incentive for the entrant to exert a
positive effort as the prize associated with any rank is always the same within
a scenario. In this case, S(t) is trivially a singleton which means every entrant
uses a pure strategy. Now if there is some scenario, say scenario n, which
happens with positive probability, such that wn,i > wn,j for some i, j with
1 ≤ i < j ≤ n. Then in this case, pooling can never happen. Pooling means
that there is some effort level e such that e ∈ S(t) for t ∈ T ′ where T ′ has a
positive measure. This is because if that is the case, then ties happen with
positive probability. However, since wn,i > wn,j, an entrant with type t ∈ T ′
can increase effort e by an infinitesimal amount such that the effort cost is
negligible but the expected prize has a discrete jump. Since pooling can never
happen, it follows that ties happen with zero probability. This in turn implies
that every entrant uses a pure strategy. This is because if there exists some
t > t0 such that S(t) contains at least two points, say e1 and e2. Without
loss of generality, assume that e1 < e2. However, since ties happen with zero
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probability, by Lemma 2.2 exerting effort e1 yields the same expected prize as
e2 (i.e., V˜ (e1) = V˜ (e2)). This implies that exerting effort e1 is strictly better.
A contradiction. Thus, S(t) is a singleton so that it is a function. This also
means that every entrant uses a pure strategy. Note that S(t) must be strictly
increasing. To see this, first note that it must be weakly increasing by Lemma
2.2. Suppose there exist t1, t2 with t1 < t2 such that S(t1) = S(t2). Then for
any t ∈ [t1, t2], S(t) = S(t2). This means that there is pooling when t ∈ [t1, t2].
A contradiction. 
Proof of Lemma 2.4: We only need to consider the case that the bidding
function is strictly increasing. In this case, type t0 is the infimum of types that
will enter the contest so that such type entrant must always obtain the lowest
prizes in every scenario in any symmetric strictly increasing bidding function.
Therefore, if the t0 type exerts a strictly positive effort, then by exerting zero
effort his expected prize does not change, while he saves the effort cost. This
would violate the incentive compatibility. Therefore, the t0 type must exert
zero effort. 
Proof of Lemma 2.5: First note that if wn,1 = wn,2 = . . . = wn,n, then
e(n)(t,Wn, t
c) = 0 for all t ≥ tc so that 1) and 2) in Lemma 2.5 are trivially
satisfied.
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Now assume wn,1 > wn,n. Then similar to the proof of Lemma 2.3, the
symmetric bidding function is strictly increasing. To derive the bidding func-
tion and total efforts, we adopt an approach similar to the revenue equivalence
result in auctions.
Suppose each of the n entrants reports his type to the contest designer. This
constitutes a report profile t. The mechanism consists of v(t) and e(t), where
v(t) = (v1(t), v2(t), . . . , vn(t)) ∈ Rn and e(t) = (e1(t), e2(t), . . . , en(t)) ∈ Rn+
so that vi(ti, t−i) and ei(ti, t−i) is the prize and effort for entrant i when he
reports ti.








where t−i = (t1, ..., ti−1, ti+1, ..., tn) and g−i(t−i, t
c) denotes the density of t−i ∈ [tc, b]n−1.
Given that other entrants truthfully report their types, entrant i’s expected
payoff when reporting t˜i is









Incentive compatibility constraint reads
ui(ti, ti) ≥ ui(t˜i, ti), ∀t˜i, ti, ∀i. (B.1)
Define u˜i(t˜i, ti) = ti · ui(t˜i, ti). Then














|t˜i=ti = V˜ (n)i (ti),
which leads to






Standard derivations such as those in Myerson [41] lead to that IC holds if















i) ≥ V˜ (n)i (ti), ∀t′i > ti,∀i.

















Now we are ready to prove the lemma. Note that the contest game is a
special mechanism so that it must satisfy the IC constraint. As a result, the
bidding function which is independent of rivals’ reports in the contest game











i (s)ds− tc · ui(tc, tc).
Since the bidding function is strictly increasing, ties happen with zero prob-
ability so that type tc’s expected prize V˜
(n)
i (t
c) = wn,n. Combined with the
1Note that J(t) = t− 1−F (t)f(t) = t− 1−G(t,t
c)
g(t,tc) , t ≥ tc.
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assumption that type tc exerts zero effort, we have ui(t
c, tc) = wn,n. Thus, it
suffices to characterize the expected prize V˜
(n)
i (ti) for all i to derive the bidding
function and the expected total efforts.
Recall that when wn,1 > wn,n, any symmetric equilibrium is pure and
strictly increasing. As a result, for entrant i who uses type ti’s strategy, his
probability of being the n+1−j’th place winner (i.e., there are n−j entrants’




Gj−1(ti, tc)(1− G(ti, tc))n−j, where 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Thus, the expected prize














i (t) = V˜
(n)
j (t) by symmetry so that we can drop the subscript.









Gj−1(t, tc)(1−G(t, tc)) = V (n)(t).
Therefore, the bidding function is
e(n)(t,Wn, t








J(t)V (n)(t)g(t, tc)dt− ntcwn,n.
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Moreover, the uniqueness of the bidding function is obvious since it is uniquely
pinned down by the expected prize function, which is unique. 
Proof of Proposition 2.1: Note that if for any n such that pn > 0, wn,1 =
wn,n, then e
(n)(t,Wn, t
c) = 0 as in the proof of Lemma 2.5. Then Proposition
2.1 trivially holds. Now assume that for some n such that pn > 0, wn,1 > wn,n,
then by the proof of Lemma 2.3, the bidding function is strictly increasing.
The proof of this case is similar to that of Lemma 2.5. By Lemma 2.3, every
entrant uses pure strategy. Assume that e(t,W, tc) is a symmetric bidding
function under the prize allocation vector W. By Lemma 2.4, the threshold
type tc entrant must bid zero, i.e., e(tc,W, tc) = 0. To derive the symmetric
bidding function and show its uniqueness, we shall also use the same idea as
revenue equivalence in auctions.
We first look at a general contest mechanism as in the proof of Lemma 2.5.
Since the number of entrants is random, we make use of the semirevelation
principle (Stegeman [52]). According to that, there is no loss to focus on
semidirect mechanisms where only the participants are required to reveal his
type to the designer, while those who do not participate are not required
to send messages. And then given the reports, the mechanism specifies the
prize and effort for each contestant. Our goal here is to use the incentive
compatibility constraint in the semidirect mechanism to express the effort
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function in terms of the prize allocation rule.
Following Stegeman [52], we use a null message ∅ to denote the signal of
nonparticipation. There is no loss to confine the message space to [a, b]∪{∅} for
every contestant. Denote m˜i(ti, 1) as the message contestant i with type ti re-
ports when he participates, where ”1” means participation. Similarly, m˜i(ti, 0)
is the message contestant i with type ti sends when he does not participate,
where ”0” means nonparticipation. For convenience, m˜i(ti, 0) = ∅. A contes-
tant’s strategy pii(ti) can be expressed as (qi(ti), m˜i(ti, 1)), where qi(ti) ∈ [0, 1]
is the probability of entry. Denote pi = (pi1, pi2, . . . , piN) as the strategy profile.
pi is semidirect if m˜i(ti, 1) = ti, ∀ti ∈ [a, b],∀i ∈ N , where N is the set of po-
tential contestants. Let s˜ = (s˜1, . . . , s˜N) denote the message profile reported.
A mechanism can be denoted by (v(˜s), e(˜s)), where v(˜s) = (v1(˜s), · · · , vN (˜s))
and e(˜s) = (e1(˜s), · · · , eN (˜s)) are the prize allocation function and effort func-
tion, respectively. So vi(˜s) and ei(˜s) are the prize and effort for contestant i,
respectively.2
As in Stegeman [52], we call θ = (pi,v, e) a procedure. It is semidirect if
pi is semidirect. According to the semirevelation principle in Stegeman [52],
there is no loss of generality to restrict attention to semidirect procedures
2Note that the specification here allows the effort required by the mechanism varies with
the number of entrants which covers the case that the entrant’s effort provision is uniform
across all scenarios. Our interest here is to use the IC in the semidirect mechanism to rewrite
the effort function in terms of the prize allocation rule.
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(mechanisms) in which it is an equilibrium for every participant to truthfully
reveal his type, while the nonparticipant is not required to submit a signal.
Since we focus on threshold entry at tc, we can further restrict the message
space to [tc, b]∪{∅} for every contestant. Threshold-entry means pii(ti) = (1, ti)
if ti ∈ [tc, b]; pii(ti) = (0, ∅), if ti ∈ [a, tc). For notation simplicity, let mi(ti) be
the message sent by contestant i with type ti in the semidirect mechanisms.
Therefore, mi(ti) = ti, if ti ∈ [tc, b];mi(ti) = ∅, if ti ∈ [a, tc).





where t−i = (t1, . . . , ti−1, ti+1, . . . , tN), f−i(t−i) is the density of t−i, and m−i(t−i)
is the message sent by t−i.
Clearly, V˜i(ti) = 0 when ti < t
c. We use ui(t˜i, ti) to denote the expected
utility of contestant i when his type is ti and adopts the strategy pii(t˜i). Given
other contestants truthfully report their messages, contestant i’s expected pay-
off when adopting the strategy pii(t˜i) is






IC and IR require that
ui(ti, ti) ≥ ui(t˜i, ti),∀ti, t˜i ∈ [tc, b],∀i; (B.2)
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ui(ti, ti) ≥ 0,∀ti ∈ [tc, b],∀i; (B.3)
ui(t˜i, ti) ≤ 0, ∀ti < tc,∀t˜i ≥ tc, ∀i. (B.4)
(B.2) and (B.4) are the incentive compatibility (IC) conditions. (B.3) is
the entrant’s participation constraint.
Define u˜i(t˜i, ti) = ti · ui(t˜i, ti). For contestant i with type ti ≥ tc, if he
mimics the strategy of t˜i ≥ tc, we have































V˜i(s)ds− tcui(tc, tc),∀ti ≥ tc,∀i. (B.5)
Note that
vi(s) = ei(s) = 0,∀s with si = ∅,∀i,
since the nonparticipants does not exert effort and does not obtain any prize.
Therefore, according to (B.5) the expected total efforts inducible under the

































c, tc)tc(1− F (tc)). (B.6)
Now we are ready to prove Proposition 2.1 for the case of strictly increasing
bidding function. Since the effort bidding function e(t,W, tc) must satisfy the
IC constraint in the semidirect mechanism, according to (B.5), we have3
e(t,W, tc) = tV˜ (t)−
∫ ti
tc
V˜ (s)ds− tcu(tc, tc). (B.7)
3Here we drop the subscript i since we focus on symmetric equilibrium.
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Thus, we only need to pin down the expected prize. To this end, note that
since the bidding function is strictly increasing, for an entrant who mimics
type t ≥ tc, the probability that he ranks the n + 1 − j’th place winner (i.e.,
there are n−j entrants’ types are higher than his and j−1 entrants’ types are





Gj−1(t, tc)(1−G(t, tc))n−j, where 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Moreover,
















Gj−1(t, tc)(1−G(t, tc))n−j. (B.8)





Substituting (B.8) and (B.9) into (B.7), we obtain the expression of e(t,W, tc)
as in the proposition. Note that the uniqueness of the bidding function follows
from the uniqueness of expected prize (B.8). Finally, substituting (B.8) into









the expression of TE(W, tc) as in the proposition. 
Proof of Lemma 2.6: Denote the CDF of the i’th order statistics of the n
i.i.d. random variables following CDF G(t, tc) as G(i,n)(t, t
c). It is well know











































We first prove the following lemma.







c)dt for any i




Proof of Lemma B.1: First recall that J(t) = t− 1−F (t)
f(t)
and that G(t, tc) =
F (t)−F (tc)
1−F (tc) , t ∈ [tc, b]. Therefore, J(t) = t− 1−G(t,t
c)
g(t,tc)












































































































= tc > 0.
This completes the proof of the lemma. 
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The above lemma actually says that the weighted average of the virtual
efficiency function obtains its maximum when taking expectation with respect
to the highest order statistics. Moreover, taking expectation with respect to
the highest order statistics is strictly positive. Now coming back to (B.10).
The expected total efforts can be seen as a linear combination of the n prizes
wn,1, wn,2, . . . , wn,n, with the coefficient
∫ b
tc
J(t)g(n+1−j,n)(t, tc)dt decreasing in
j, minus ntcwn,n. Constrained by
n∑
j=1
wn,j = Vn, with wn,n = Kn ≤ Vn
n
,
it is obvious that setting wn,1 = Vn − (n − 1)Kn and wn,j = Kn for all n ≥ 2
is optimal. 













J(t){[Vn − (n− 1)Kn]Gn−1(t, tc)












J(t)(Vn − nKn)Gn−1(t, tc)g(t, tc)dt.
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J(t)(Vn − nKn)Gn−1(t, tc)g(t, tc)dt











J(t)(Vn − nKn)Gn−1(t, tc)g(t, tc)dt






J(t)(Vn − nKn)Gn−1(t, tc)g(t, tc)dt.

Proof of Proposition 2.2: Let K = (K1, K2, . . . , KN) be the optimal min-
imum prize vector. If tc = a, then pn = 0 for all n ≤ N − 1. In this case,
only KN is relevant. It is obvious that the optimal KN = 0, which satisfies
the expression given in Proposition 2.2. Note that as mentioned in footnote
14, the optimal Kn for n ≤ N − 1 may not be unique as they do not enter the
objective function.
Now we come to the case that tc > a. Suppose to the contrary that at
the optimum, there is some n < N such that Kn <
V
n
. Choose  > 0 such
that K ′n = Kn +  ≤ Vn . To maintain the equality in (2.6), KN should be
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changed to K ′N = KN − pnpN .4 Thus, the minimum prize vector now becomes
K′ = (K1, . . . , Kn−1, K ′n, Kn+1, . . . , KN−1, K
′
N). The change of total efforts is
TE(tc; K′) − TE(tc; K). Our goal is to show that this difference is strictly
positive.
To this end, notice that the difference can be expressed as (dropping the














J(t)[NGN−1(t, tc)− nGn−1(t, tc)]g(t, tc)dt.
We need to show that
∫ b
tc
J(t)[NGN−1(t, tc)− nGn−1(t, tc)]g(t, tc)dt > 0. (B.11)
It suffices to show that, for any m ≥ 1,
∫ b
tc
J(t)mGm−1(t, tc)g(t, tc)dt <
∫ b
tc
J(t)(m+ 1)Gm(t, tc)g(t, tc)dt. (B.12)
4Note that pj(t


























































J(t)mGm−1(t, tc)g(t, tc)dt is strictly increasing in m when
m ≥ 1. Therefore, (B.11) is satisfied.
The above argument shows that when tc > a, Kn =
V
n
, ∀n < N , at the
optimum. KN is determined by (2.6) by substituting Kn =
V
n
, ∀n < N . 
Proof of Lemma 2.7: It suffices to show that dTE
∗(a)
dtc
> 0. In fact, since
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TE∗(tc) = NV (1− FN(tc))[b−N
∫ b
tc











(1− FN(tc))(N − 1)
∫ b
tc





= N(N − 1)V f(a)
∫ b
a




Proofs of Chapter Three
Derivation of the first-best benchmark: Obviously, to minimize (3.1), we
should set piFB(θ) = 0. And then notice that for any fixed α, to minimize the
total cost, we should set pFB(θ, c) = 1 when c ≤ c0, and pFB(θ, c) = 0 when








Note that this function has increasing difference in (α, θ) since Cαθ > 0. The









Hαα(c, α)dc > 0.
Note that the cutoff is fixed at c0 regardless of the effort level, and the objective
function (C.1) is convex in effort. Thus, the principal would implement a
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deterministic effort.






FB(θ))dc ≥ 0, with equality when αFB(θ) > 0.
(C.2)
Note that since the function (C.1) has increasing difference and θl < θh, we
have αFB(θh) ≤ αFB(θl), with equality only when αFB(θl) = 0.
Payment yFB(θ, c) is set at c0 when p
FB(θ, c) = 1; otherwise yFB(θ, c) = 0.
Payment xFB(θ) equals C(αFB(θ), θ) − ∫ c
c
p˜iFB(θ, c)h(c, αFB(θ))dc to extract
all the surplus. It is easy to verify that the agent’s payoff is nonnegative for
both two stages so that the individual rationality constraints are satisfied. 
Derivation of the optimal pure adverse selection mechanism: As in
standard discrete adverse selection model, at the optimum it must be the case
that pihh = 0 and pill = C(α˜h, θh)−C(α˜h, θl), since θh > θl leads to C(α˜h, θh)−
C(α˜h, θl) ≥ 0 as Cθ ≥ 0. Therefore, the θl type enjoys an information rent of
C(α˜h, θh)−C(α˜h, θl). And then IC is equivalent to α˜h ≤ α˜l,2 while IR can be
dropped. Applying these results, we obtain the following equivalent problem
1Note that the optimal solution must be finite. This is because Cα(α
FB(θ), θ)) ≥
Cα(0, θ) > 0 and limα→+∞
∫ c0
c
Hα(c, α)dc = 0.
2To see this, note that IC is equivalent to C(α˜h, θh)− C(α˜h, θl) ≤ C(α˜l, θh)− C(α˜l, θl),





TCp = c0 + q[C(α˜l, θl) +
∫ c
c
p˜(θl, c)(c− c0)h(c, α˜l)dc]





p˜(θh, c)(c− c0)h(c, α˜h)dc]
subject to
α˜l ≥ α˜h ≥ 0; (C.3)
p˜(θ, c) is decreasing in c, ∀θ. (C.4)
The procedure of solving the above minimization problem is standard: First
drop the above two monotonicity constraints ((C.3) and (C.4)) and solve for
the optimal mechanism in the relaxed problem, then check that the dropped
two constraints are satisfied at the solution.
In fact, for the relaxed problem, we can minimize it pointwisely. It is clear
that at the optimum, p˜∗(θ, c) = 1 if c ≤ c0, and p˜∗(θ, c) = 0 if c > c0 for






(c− c0)h(c, α˜l)dc, (C.5)




While for type θh, the minimization problem boils down to
min
α˜h≥0












The first order derivative with respect to α˜h is given by:





Note that the optimal α˜h must be finite since the first term is always strictly
positive, while the second term
∫ c0
c
Hα(c, α˜h)dc decreases to zero as α˜h tends
to infinity. The optimum, α˜∗h, must satisfy
Cα(α˜
∗






h)dc ≥ 0, with equality if α˜∗h > 0.
Note that





= Cα(α˜h, θh) +
q




Recall that Cαα ≥ 0, Cααθ ≥ 0 and Hαα(c, α) < 0, which means Cα(α˜h, θh)
and [Cα(α˜h, θh) − Cα(α˜h, θl)] (i.e.,
∫ θh
θl
Cαθ(α˜h, θ)dθ) increase with α˜h, and∫ c0
c
Hα(c, α˜h)dc decreases with α˜h. Thus the optimal α˜
∗
h is pinned down by
the unique solution of the first order condition, and the global second order
condition must hold.
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Recall that αFBh is the solution to (C.2) when θ = θh. We must have
α˜∗h ≤ αFBh with equality only when αFBh = 0.3 Since αFBh < αFBl and αFBl = α˜∗l ,
we have α˜∗h < α˜
∗
l .
Notice that the specification of the second stage mechanism satisfies the
monotonicity constraint (C.4), and (C.3) is also satisfied since α˜∗h < α˜
∗
l . Thus,
as mentioned in footnote 29, the optimal (deterministic) mechanism involves
no bunching so that the deterministic mechanism is indeed optimal (cf. Strausz
[53]). 
Proof of x˜∗l < x˜
∗











H(c, α˜∗h)dc decreases on
[0, α˜∗h] by first order condition. We thus have
x˜∗h =






















H(c, 0)dc ≤ 0.
Similarly, since α˜∗l > 0 is the unique minimizer of the function C(α, θl) −∫ c0
c




















H(c, α˜∗l )dc]− [C(α∗h, θl)−
∫ c0
c




Proof of Lemma 3.2: We first show that
− C(αhh, θh) + C(αhl, θl) +
∫ c
c









As a result, pi(θh, θh) ≤ pi(θl, θl).
In fact,




= −C(αhh, θl) +
∫ c
c
p(θh, c)H(c, αhh)dc+ C(αhh, θl)− C(αhh, θh)
≤ −C(αhl, θl) +
∫ c
c
p(θh, c)H(c, αhl)dc+ C(αhh, θl)− C(αhh, θh)









p(θh, c)H(c, α)dc, α ≥ 0.
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And the second inequality follows from θl < θh and Cθ ≥ 0.
At the optimum, pi(θh, θh) = 0. Otherwise, the principal can reduce pi(θl, θl)
and pi(θh, θh) by the same amount without violating (3.17) and (3.19) since we
have shown that pi(θh, θh) ≤ pi(θl, θl). By doing so, the total cost decreases.
(3.17) must be binding as well at the optimum. Suppose this is not the
case, then the designer can reduce pi(θl, θl) to decrease the total cost without
violating (3.19) since we have shown that (C.7) holds.




p(θh, c)(H(c, αhl)−H(c, αhh))dc. 
Proof of Lemma 3.3: It suffices to show that for any fixed αhl, αhh, and
p(θh, c) satisfying (3.15), setting p(θl, c) as the one in Lemma 3.3 is optimal.
To show this, first ignore constraint (3.15) for i = j = l, which is the only
relevant constraint about both p(θl, c) and αll.
4 For any αll, to minimize the
objective function TCE, it is easy to see that it is optimal to set p(θl, c) = 1
when c ≤ c0, and p(θl, c) = 0 when c > c0. The next step is to choose the
optimal αll to minimize TCE. If the optimal αll satisfies (3.15) for i = j = l,
then we actually have found the above optimal p(θl, c) and αll. Note that we
have fixed all the other variables, i.e., αhl, αhh, and p(θh, c). The only relevant
4Though (3.15) is relevant to p(θl, c) for i = l, j = h, however, the variable αlh does
not appear in the objective function TCE . In fact, once p(θl, c) is determined, αlh is also
determined by (3.15).
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(c− c0)h(c, αll)dc]. (C.8)
Drop the factor q since it is irrelevant for minimization. First order deriva-





















Hαα(c, αll)dc > 0.








ll )dc ≥ 0 with equality when αmll > 0,
which is precisely the moral hazard constraint (3.15) we omitted in the be-
ginning. In addition, comparing with (C.2), it is obvious that the solution is
exactly the same as αFBl . 
Proof of Lemma 3.4: Consider the function
g(t) = C(β∗(t), θh)− C(γ∗(t), θl) +
∫ t
c
(H(c, γ∗(t))−H(c, β∗(t)))dc, t ∈ [c, c],
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where β∗(t) is the (unique) maximizer of
τ1(β) = −C(β, θh) +
∫ t
c
H(c, β)dc, β ≥ 0,
and γ∗(t) is the (unique) maximizer of
τ2(γ) = −C(γ, θl) +
∫ t
c
H(c, γ)dc, γ ≥ 0.
That is,




∗(t))dc ≤ 0, with equality if β∗(t) > 0, (C.9)
and




∗(t))dc ≤ 0, with equality if γ∗(t) > 0. (C.10)
We need to show that g(t) is increasing in [c, c] and strictly increasing
whenever γ∗(t) > 0. Note that g(t) is a continuous function. There are two
cases to consider.
Case 1 : −Cα(0, θl)+
∫ c
c
Hα(c, 0)dc > 0 and −Cα(0, θh)+
∫ c
c
Hα(c, 0)dc ≤ 0.5
In this case, β∗(t) = 0 for all t ∈ [c, c]. And there exists a t˜1 ∈ (c, c) such that
(C.10) holds with equality for all t ∈ [t˜1, c] and γ∗(t) = 0 for all t ∈ [c, t˜1].
Then, when t ≤ t˜1, g(t) = 0; when t > t˜1, g(t) > 0 since choosing γ = 0 is




Hα(c, 0)dc ≤ 0 is impossible since we have assumed that Cα(0, θl) <∫ c0
c




increasing in [t˜1, c], it suffices to show that it is strictly increasing in (t˜1, c]. In
this interval,










Note that g(t) is differentiable in this range (by implicit function theorem),
and by envelope theorem (or taking derivative with respect to t),
g′(t) = H(t, γ∗(t))−H(t, 0) > 0.
Therefore, g(t) is strictly increasing in (t˜1, c].
Case 2 : −Cα(0, θh) +
∫ c
c
Hα(c, 0)dc > 0. In this case, there exists tˆ1 and tˆ2
with c < tˆ1 < tˆ2 < c, such that: β
∗(t) = 0 when t ≤ tˆ2, β∗(t) > 0 when t > tˆ2;
γ∗(t) = 0 when t ≤ tˆ1, γ∗(t) > 0 when t > tˆ1. Therefore, g(t) = 0 when t ≤ tˆ1.
When t ∈ (tˆ1, tˆ2],
g(t) = −C(γ∗(t), θl) +
∫ t
c







When t ∈ (tˆ2, c],
g(t) = C(β∗(t), θh)− C(γ∗(t), θl) +
∫ t
c














Therefore, it suffices to show that g(t) is strictly increasing in (tˆ1, c]. To
see this, note that g(t) is continuous in this interval and it is differentiable in
(tˆ1, tˆ2) ∪ (tˆ2, c).6 Taking derivative with respect to t: When t ∈ (tˆ1, tˆ2),
g′(t) = H(t, γ∗(t))−H(t, 0) > 0.
When t ∈ (tˆ2, c),
g′(t) = H(t, γ∗(t))−H(t, β∗(t)) > 0
since γ∗(t) > β∗(t) when γ∗(t) > 0.
In sum, we have shown that g(t) is increasing in [c, c] and strictly increasing
whenever γ∗(t) > 0. 
Proof of Lemma 3.5: Notice that since α∗ll and c
∗
l have been solved, the only




6β∗(t) = 0 when t ∈ (tˆ1, tˆ2), which is trivially differentiable. When t ∈ (tˆ2, c), it is




− Cα(αhl, θl) +
∫ ch
c
Hα(c, αhl)dc ≤ 0, with equality if αhl > 0; (C.11)
− Cα(αhh, θh) +
∫ ch
c
Hα(c, αhh)dc ≤ 0, with equality if αhh > 0, (C.12)
where








For convenience, call this Problem (R). Recall by Lemma 3.1 that αhl ≥ αhh
with strict inequality when αhl > 0.
Also recall that Cα(0, θl) <
∫ c0
c
Hα(c, 0)dc by assumption. Define cˆ1 as
the cutoff such that
∫ cˆ1
c
Hα(c, 0)dc = Cα(0, θl). So we have cˆ1 < c0. Then








Hα(c, 0)dc < Cα(0, θh)), define cˆ2 = c. It is clear that cˆ2 ≥ cˆ1.
Our goal is to show that ch ≥ c0 is not optimal. There are two cases to
consider: Case 1: cˆ2 > c0 and Case 2: cˆ2 ≤ c0.
Case 1 (cˆ2 > c0) consists of two subcases: Case 1.1: ch ∈ [cˆ1, cˆ2] and Case
1.2: ch ∈ (cˆ2, c].
Case 1.1: ch ∈ [cˆ1, cˆ2]. In this case, (C.11) is binding while (C.12) is
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non-binding, i.e., αhl > 0 = αhh. Then







where ch ∈ [cˆ1, cˆ2]. Using envelope theorem,
∂T̂C
∂ch
= q[H(ch, αhl(ch))−H(ch, 0)] + (1− q)(ch − c0)h(ch, 0),
where αhl(ch) is the effort determined by (C.11) with equality. Note that
c0 ∈ [cˆ1, cˆ2] for Case 1.1. Take any ch ∈ [c0, cˆ2], since αhl(ch) > 0, ∂T̂C∂ch > 0.
Therefore, it is never optimal to set ch ∈ [c0, cˆ2].
Case 1.2: ch ∈ (cˆ2, c]. In this case, (C.11) and (C.12) are both binding.
Then Problem (R) becomes a minimization problem with two equality con-
straints. Construct the Lagrangian by multiplying λ to (C.11) and µ to (C.12),
That is,







The first order conditions are7
∂L
∂ch
= q(H(ch, αhl)−H(ch, αhh)) + (1− q)(ch − c0)h(ch, αhh)
+ λHα(ch, αhl) + µHα(ch, αhh) = 0; (C.13)
7 ∂L
∂ch




= Cα(αhh, θh)− q
∫ ch
c
























= (1− q)(ch − c0)Hα(ch, αhh) + µ(−Cαα(αhh, θh) +
∫ ch
c




= −qCα(αhl, θl) + q
∫ ch
c




= λ(−Cαα(αhl, θl) +
∫ ch
c
Hαα(c, αhl)dc) = 0. (C.15)
Note that −Cαα(αhh, θh) +
∫ ch
c
Hαα(c, αhh)dc < 0 and −Cαα(αhl, θl) +∫ ch
c
Hαα(c, αhl)dc < 0 when ch > c. If ch ≥ cˆ2(> c0), from (C.15), we ob-
tain λ = 0. And from (C.14), µ > 0. Since αhl > αhh > 0 in Case 1.2,
H(ch, αhl)−H(ch, αhh) > 0. However, substituting ch ≥ c0, λ = 0, and µ > 0
into (C.13) leads to
q(H(ch, αhl)−H(ch, αhh)) < 0,
a contradiction.
Therefore, under Case 1 it is never optimal to set c∗h ≥ c0.
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Case 2: cˆ2 ≤ c0. In this case, both (C.11) and (C.12) are binding when
ch ≥ c0. Problem (R) becomes a minimization problem with two equality
constraints when ch ≥ c0. Then we can set up the Lagrangian. Using similar
arguments as those in Case 1.2, it can be shown that setting c∗h ≥ c0 is never
optimal.





Proof of Lemma 3.6: Note that pi(θh, θh) = 0 and
pi(θl, θl) = C(α
∗




therefore, to check (3.16), it suffices to check








Notice that in terms of the g(·) function defined in the proof of Lemma
3.4, the LHS is g(c∗h) while the RHS is g(c0). Since we have shown that g(t) is
increasing by Lemma 3.4 and c∗h < c0 holds by Lemma 3.5, (3.16) holds. 





H(c, α∗hh)dc by (3.11), we have
x∗(θh) = C(α∗hh, θh)−
∫ c∗h
c
H(c, α∗hh)dc ≤ −
∫ c∗h
c
H(c, 0) ≤ 0,
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H(c, α)dc, α ≥ 0,
so that setting α = 0 always leads to a weakly higher function value than that
when α = α∗hh. x
∗(θh) ≤ 0 means that the type θh agent pays to the principal.
By Lemma 3.2
pi(θl, θl) = C(α
∗





pi(θl, θl) = x













= x∗(θh) + [−C(α∗hl, θl) +
∫ c∗h
c




≤ x∗(θh) + [−C(α∗hl, θl) +
∫ c0
c






where the first inequality follows from c∗h < c0 and the second inequality follows
from α∗ll (= α
FB




H(c, α)dc, α ≥ 0.
Thus x∗(θl) < x∗(θh) ≤ −
∫ c∗h
c
H(c, 0) ≤ 0. 
Proof of 0 < p∗h < p
∗




l − r∗l = c0 + x∗(θl) and since
x∗(θl) < 0 by Proposition 3.4, p∗l < c0. Now it suffices to show that p
∗
h > 0
and p∗l > p
∗
h. For the first inequality, notice that
p∗h = c
∗
h − r∗h = c∗h + x∗(θh)






> c∗h + C(α
∗
hh, θh)− (c∗h − c)
= C(α∗hh, θh) + c ≥ 0.
For the second inequality, we need to show that
c0 + x
∗(θl) > c∗h + x
∗(θh),
that is,
c0 − c∗h − C(α∗hl, θl) +
∫ c∗h
c
H(c, α∗hl)dc− (−C(α∗ll, θl) +
∫ c0
c
H(c, α∗ll)dc) > 0.
(C.16)
Define
V (α, y) = −C(α, θl) +
∫ y
c
H(c, α)dc, y ∈ (c, c),
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and
V ∗(y) = max
α≥0
V (α, y).
That is, V ∗(y) is the value function of V (α, y). By envelope theorem,
V ∗
′
(y) = H(y, α∗(y)),
where α∗(y) is the unique maximizer of V (α, y).8 Thus, |V ∗′(y)| < 1.




hl is the unique maximizer of V (α, c
∗
h)
and α∗ll is the unique maximizer of V (α, c0). Therefore, showing (C.16) is
equivalent to showing
c0 − c∗h > V ∗(c0)− V ∗(c∗h).
By mean value theorem,
|V ∗(c0)− V ∗(c∗h)| = |V ∗′(ξ)|(c0 − c∗h)
< c0 − c∗h,
where ξ ∈ (c∗h, c0) and the inequality follows from |V ∗′(ξ)| < 1. This completes
the proof. 
8Note that V (α, y) is strictly concave in α ∈ (0,+∞).
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